

THE AMERICAN I M A G O

VOLUME 18

FALL

NO. 3

1961

*A Psychoanalytic Journal
for the Arts and Sciences*

COPYRIGHT BY
AMERICAN IMAGO 1961

Founded by: Hanns Sachs, Boston

Publisher and Managing Editor: George B. Wilbur, M. D.

PRINTED AT THE REGISTER PRESS
YARMOUTH PORT, MASSACHUSETTS

A Psychoanalytic Appreciation of American Government

by

John M. Dorsey, M.D.

Government is not reason, it is not eloquence - it is
force! Like fire, it is a dangerous servant and a fear-
ful master.

George Washington

Introduction

My Country, 'tis of thee!

Samuel F. Smith

By "Psychoanalytic" here I refer particularly to a specific method of therapeutic research: the analysand's treatment of his mental life with his mind's mobilizing and disburdening force of self-consciousness. The purpose of this "Appreciation" is to honor with *self-felt* consciousness the specific mental healthfulness of the democratic way of life.

Every kind of government has all of its meaning, or force, in the form of self-government. Thus, each communist, or fascist, too must live all of *his* own political system. Democratic self-government however is unique in that it is the only governmental contrivance devised especially so that each citizen requires himself to be *conscious* that his government is his self-government. *Precisely this civic insight is what is ideally meant by "informed electorate."* This study is based chiefly upon the noteworthy fact that the democratic and psychoanalytic principles exalt and enforce the same power, *self-consciousness*, as their humanizing (civilizing) instrumentality.

James Harvey Robinson described this cherished mind-

consciousness well: "The little word *my* is the most important one in all human affairs, and properly to reckon with it is the beginning of wisdom. It has the same force whether it is *my* dinner, *my* dog, and *my* house, or *my* faith, *my* country, and *my* God." "What a great number of people" think, is an abstraction of limited self-helpfulness. "What each man thinks," or "what I think", is a concrete view which can bear investigation. The abstract, "A great number of minds," cannot pass for the concrete, *One real mind*. The real culture of the real individual cannot be equated with the illusional individuality of the imagined cult. "Consensus of opinion" rules despotically where *opinion of consensus* is repressed. Education must be clearly observable as a self-activity if it is to contribute most to the creation of a government clearly observable as self-government.

Recently I tried to find a helpful, somewhat detailed, account of the ideal way to conduct a school board election, specifically so that it might satisfy the discerning educational administrator that he is as safe as can be from organized partisan political pressures. No first-rate educator will take on, or stay long with, school living in which his most cherished ideal, *academic freedom*, is subordinate to shifting political ideals of "practical expediency."

I wished to secure carefully developed viewpoints describing how the power of education, as distinguished from every other manifestation of power, might protect itself in terms of the innumerable political exigencies of these dangerous days. I was able to gather a fair number of these political insights from contemporary sources. Many a one of my American forefathers seemed consciously self-possessed enough to appreciate his living experience as his learning experience, to equate his human and academic freedom, his individualism and Americanism, his selfishness and world patriotism.

Democratic Education

"Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind."

Thomas Jefferson

The primary political truth is this: The complete American citizen is one who sees all that he learns about "government" as being developments of his own mind's creation. E Pluribus Unum is his motto, as it is the motto of his country. His recognition of his all-inclusive selfpossession prevents his "memorizing factual data of civics" as constituting citizenship training. Memorizing which is accomplished at the cost of self-forgetting is a hideous caricature of education.

The illusion of "communicating" democratic principles cannot pass as education for democratic living. Dictionaries are of little help in clarifying the definition of any kind of "teaching." The definition of philology in the latest edition of my *Encyclopaedia Britannica* leaves its meaning somewhat less chaotic than it was in the first edition (1771), but the term continues to be used in its most confused and confusing significance, namely, as having to do with "communicable" words. It will probably be many centuries before this superstition (that language enables "communication") can be renounced. Truth is the product of autobiography only. A man's history as to how he has consciously cherished his autonomy reveals to himself the extent of sincerity in his living. By habitual awareness that my life makes all of my world, I can enjoy - in Jefferson's words - "the illimitable freedom of the human mind to explore and expose every subject susceptible of its contemplation."

Certainly one cannot enable another to see the necessity for self-government. A teacher cannot enable his pupil to see *that* (life) necessity, any more than he can do his pupil's breathing for him. Only a consciousness of learning which is recognizable as an *extension of self-awareness*, is most suitable to the dignity of the human mind.

The insightful teacher of *conscious* self-government must be personally interested in having *his* pupil make himself

see the benefits of conscious self-government. A teacher may and does say what he knows about democracy, but he grows his speaking exclusively as his self-development. His pupil may have (hear) his teacher say what he knows about democracy, but he too grows his "hearing" as an extension of his own self-hood. Whether or not a pupil decides to live his teacher's spoken knowledge wholly as his accepted view, is a matter which is entirely up to the individual pupil. Upon this decision, however, rests any meaning of the concept "successful teaching." It is to be noted that every educational success is a triumph of the learner only. The insightful teacher finds his educational triumph in seeing his pupil as thus educating himself.

That great English statesman, John Bright, wished that the young Englishman would study his American authors, and observed to a renowned American, "I read your poets in preference to ours, not because they are greater poets, but because they are greater citizens. Your Bryant, your Longfellow, your Whittier, and your Lowell take part in a common life of the nation, and are all better poets because they are completer men." A complete, full-grown, American citizen is necessarily a man of peace, and he is wise to the fact that democratic government provides a peaceful method for every needed reform. Jefferson proudly and properly prided himself in the fact that his administration was a war-free one.

Exactly the opposite of Jefferson's intention, Does the American pupil tend to live his public schooling *to the end* that he see little or no self in it? Does he consummate his educational living by not even missing his appreciation of his own creaturehood in it? Does the American pupil tend to consider education as an opportunity to learn as much as possible about "somebody else" and "something else?" Such unconscious self-experience cannot prepare him for assuming his natural right of conscious self-government. On the contrary, by disciplining his mind in self-unconsciousness he prepares himself to require a minimum of conscious self-government. For the insightful American educator no greater

danger exists than that this kind of schooling by the American citizen be overlooked any longer.

The only possible way to teach Jefferson or Shakespeare safely or sanely, is for the educator to be aware that he is growing his own Jefferson or Shakespeare meanings, by *consciously* cultivating the thoughts and feelings in himself which he imagines his Jefferson or Shakespeare to have. "This earth," cried Thoreau, "which is spread out like a map around me, is but the lining of my inmost soul exposed," and, "In *me* is the sucker that I see," and of Walden Pond,

"I am its stony shore,

And the breeze that passes o'er."

Extravagant expectations followed American legislation guaranteeing mental freedom. Jefferson hoped that public schooling would be all that would be necessary for the free-born child to develop his mind with self-consciousness, so that he might thereby grow the proper esteem for his human greatness. However, psychoanalytic experience demonstrates man's conscious self-ignorance as an essential device for his maintaining whatever sense of mental equilibrium (sense of self-identity) he has, pending his growing his *willingness* to observe his growing knowledge as self-knowledge.

My beloved Osler esteemed his Emerson highly indeed, recommending to his medical students the study of that great all-American seer's works as healthy psychological exercise. From my Emerson's Journal V page 179, I excerpt the following humane definition of Science: "The perception of identity is a good mercury of the progress of the mind. I talk with very accomplished persons who betray instantly that they are strangers in nature. The cloud, the tree, the sod, the cat, are not theirs, have nothing of them. They are visitors in the world, and all the proceedings and events are alien, immeasurable, and across a great gulf. The poet, the true naturalist, for example, domesticates himself in nature with a sense of strict consanguinity. His own blood is in the rose and the apple-tree. This is true science." Thus Emerson recorded his prescription for his own *peaceful*

human development: *conscious* mental integration. Applying this kind of insight to his world's affairs, Crane Brinton writing upon *The Chances For A World State*, claims, "First of all, it is certain that we of Western society have never, in our five thousand years of recorded history, kept peace for long within an area save by bringing that area within the authority of a single government."

In the June issue of the *American Association Of University Professors Bulletin*,* Donald Faulkner's study, *Democracy In Higher Education*, notes:

"Many advanced thinkers in America and in other sections of the world consider civilization's only hope to lie in a more conscientious effort to understand and to make democracy work, and not in bombs and space ships, not even in an international organization backed by a world police force. That is, the world must find a more sincere, a more direct and consistent social and political organization than any so-called democracy has yet developed. This, we Americans all contend, is our nation's chief business. We, the teachers of America, hold it just as strongly to be the urgent task and the opportunity of education."

Democratic Leadership

"The republican is the only form of government which is not eternally at open or secret war with the rights of mankind."

Thomas Jefferson

The American chief executive, the President of the United States, is supreme political officer, and while in office is national head but not congressional leader of his party. The Presidency provides opportunity for the strongest kind of human mind, the kind capable of the greatest capacity for observing and extending its personal identity. Ideally each American citizen must be able to see his president as a part of his own life, not as "someone" bigger or greater than himself. Presidential ability to delegate, coordinate and

* Summer Issue, Volume 45, No. 2, June 1959.

direct nationally and internationally, is fundamental. *Conscious* self-possession, self-reliance, independence, imagination, available will power, workability and immense humanness — each a product of the discipline of self-consciousness and a democratic ideal — are qualities of presidential timber.

That person can and does "hold office," from president to precinct committeeman, who can liberally afford the self-tolerance required for being *popular*. By being "popular" I mean specifically: living his constituent willingly (consciously) as his own living of his constituent, and having his constituent live his democratic official willingly (consciously) as his own democratic officer. That politician or statesman is most popular who is capable of growing and recognizing (as his) the most individual citizen identities in his own life. He creates and acknowledges each of his fellow citizens as an entitled existent of his life, as an individuation of his individuality. John Stuart Mill defined his own political power, "the test of a great mind is agreeing in the opinions of small minds." One thing sure, the official life of a democratic leader exploiting a "cleaner-than-thou" attitude towards his electorate, is bound to be a short one.

Democratic process by its very nature ideally insures continuance of humaneness, for it bases itself entirely where it really is to be found, namely, in the mind of the individual citizen. One who, like Thomas Carlyle of 19th century England, finds democracy inseparable from mediocrity, must be one who cannot see: 1) the allness of his individuality, and 2) the health and happiness created by such true (full measured) self-consciousness. "Mediocrity" can be a most cruel word with which the hurt mind may be expressing its "worthier than thou" symptoms. Despite its admitted "mediocrity," my democratic government is the best ever devised for me to improve my appreciation of my individuality.

One insightful criticism of democracy is that it does not guarantee the best "leadership of the people." Contrary to the view of everyone inexperienced in conscious self-government, no citizen's chance of life liberty and pursuit

of happiness is enhanced by any supreme leadership of any "other man" known as a "great democrat." "Supreme leadership of somebody else," can never represent the true democratic way of life.

By definition, the only difficulty about democracy is the arduous mind reaching which any individual citizen must exert while striving to prepare himself to live *conscious* self-government. Democracy is a government of the individual, by the individual, and for the individual, - and not anything else. For years now the members of my department of psychiatry have been conducting a most helpful and most arduous in-service training program in democratic citizenship to the end of escaping authoritarianism in department organization and in medical education. This program has demonstrated that education to mature democratic citizenship is education to world citizenship and to mature mental health. I attribute unique health value to the designation, "the American physician." This "hygienic patriotism" may be derived from every physician's proper recognition of the health significance of his American citizenship. The essence of American citizenship is also my recognized psychiatric teaching ideal: the full measured appreciation of the complete sufficiency of the individual. Medical school living represents a critical incidence of civic life, an opportunity for each medical student to further his devotion to the cultivation of *self-felt* equality.

Unquestionably the development of a democratic citizen is by far the most difficult of any governmental development. It is a relatively easy matter to grow oneself as the loyal subject of a king, or as a very important cog in the very important wheel of the very important commune. Cultivating the strength of mind which enables him to see himself as the author of his liberty, as the creator of his country, as the maker of his world, - only his conscious freedom to evolve and cherish his self-sovereignty outfits the democratic elector for this kind of life appreciation.

It is an obscuration to say the "the people" represent the supreme power in democratic government. "The peo-

ple," is all and only a precious self-view, a personified abstraction, in the mind of the democratic individual. Every individual creates his own cult, or party. The foundation upon which the democratic testament rests is deeper than rejected selfness called "the people." This foundation goes down to the recognition of Human Individuality in its particularized allness. "The world is nothing, man is all," was Emerson's ideology. Of such self-insight is constituted real political genius. Comprehensively conceived individuality is neither didactic nor dogmatic. It cannot come under the category of means. It offers no help to an "outside" world, being worldwide in its own extent. It is not to be confused therefore with any doctrinaire individualism which is not at the same time recognizable as cosmopolitanism. As a valid theory of society, it sees all of "society" as only meanings in the given mind which creates them.

John Buchan (Lord Tweedsmer) described American Democracy as "the conscious work of men's hands." His further description might almost as well be applied to *conscious* mental integration, "the supreme example of a federation in being, a federation which recognizes the rights and individuality of the parts, but accepts the overriding interests of the whole." Each citizen is all of his own "people," and "people" cannot have any "say" in government. Edmund Burke, even though he too tried to lump one individual with another, did show that he recognized government to be a product of each individual: "there never was for any long time a corrupt representation of virtuous people, or a mean, sluggish, careless people that ever had a good government of any force." No matter how I consider any matter, the one fact remains: I created the consideration.

Every citizen is his own government. May that life-giving and life-satisfying truth come to his consciousness. To this end political science, *recognized as a self-development of the political scientist*, can be most helpful. Without it the individual must resign his right to be aware that he is directing his own life. Each American citizen is his own "many," not one of many, and it is his political duty to uphold that

proposition. Little wonder that Hegel, who consistently held self-consciousness to be a painful mark of frustration and helplessness, attributed to "the state" the self-evident rights of man and conceived freedom as a "social" phenomenon. The painful observation must be made that Marx, Lenin, Engels, and every "materialist" (except each one whose "material" is mental) must restrict themselves grievously in the ever helpful use of self-consciousness.

Another fact which is well worth most careful consideration is this: Rarely, if ever, has the truth been recognized that the solipsistic life orientation can deny nothing, for to do so would be to deny part of its own existence. As a rule, solipsism is summarily dismissed with the fallacy that it denies the existence of "external reality." This it does not and cannot do, despite Lenin's claim that it does. The solipsistic position was conspicuously foreign to Lenin's "materialistic" way of thinking. The subjectivism of insightful individuality can never become a serious philosophical or political position until it first becomes psychologically obvious. It is true, however, that one cannot but wonder if the all-important oneness of human individuality is not a suppressed, rather than repressed, assumption of the communist as of every other non-democratic organizer. The reality of practice sets up the truth of individuality and shows up the fiction of "society." It demonstrates that it is necessary to extend self-consciousness in order to extend good will and love.

Democratic tests of leadership are the only possible fool-proof ones. A democratic demagogue is preferable to a benevolent despot in the all-important sense that democracy keeps open the possibility of later developments of conscious self-sovereignty. Democratic politics described as becoming "too corrupt, too debased, to soil the hands of the upright citizen," are really the necessary democratic developments with which the "upright citizen" must discover for himself his own unreadiness for conscious self-government and democratic living.

Representative Government

As the happiness of the people is the sole end of government, so the consent of the people is the only foundation of it.

John Adams

"Representative government" is a psychic value. It means that the elector creates his representative as an entity of his own life, and that each representative lives each of his electors (as an entity of his own creaturehood). Human being cannot be delegated, or represented, out of itself. A mature democratic "leader" recognizes that each of his supporters lives his own leader. A leader is made up of leadership, not of followership. "I am the State", said Louis XIV and Napoleon. How different the course of history had either one said, "I am *my* State."

His democracy enables every citizen to declare that he is his own representative, that *his* agent or deputy or substitute consists entirely of his own psychic living. The full-grown (worldwide) American sees clearly that one individual *cannot* bear the authority or character of another. Quite as the psychoanalyst has learned not to identify his "object representation" with not-self in any respect, so the consciously self-possessed American does not confound his imaginings of representation with illusional externality. Democracy means, "I am equal to me," and "My representative is equal to his self." Self-possession rules out foreign representation. "It is hard for an empty sack to stand upright," said Benjamin Franklin.

An abstraction such as "representative government," "political force" or "social idealism" is a fine toboggan for my sliding out of my right mind so that I can devote myself painlessly to my personal living of self-hurt, become "hell-bent on doing good," and create the various crazes of the fanaticism motivated by my repudiated individuality. I may make every kind of a self-deceiver of myself as long as I comfort myself with my illusion that I have many others "on my side." My realizing my absolute individuality, clarifies for me the necessity for the prudence which my

sense of my true oneness enforces. I cannot take my "everything" into account in framing my peace plan (unified world) unless I can take my "everyone and everything" into account as being mine. Seeing all of my "represented" and "representative" world as my own, I sense that I cannot afford to be anesthetic about it.

It is the fundamental privilege of a human being consciously to own his "representative" as his self-property. My right to my self-property is the basis of my every other right or responsibility, and cannot be well ignored by me. I tax myself most heavily "without representation" for my devotion to remaining self-unconscious. Insofar as I am self-unconscious, my sovereignty as an individual must seem to me at best a kind of romantic notion. My disclaimer of any intent to live me as myself, can not in any sense prevent it.

My ideal of self-government is only as strong as I make it. I can take liberties with my own self-property. I cannot take liberties with the self-property of my fellow man. Only (my) he can do that. My living of my appreciation of my full autonomy enforces my seeing my fellow man's full autonomy.

This I conceive to be my American ideal: My right to, and responsibility for, my fullest conscious self-development. My "public virtue" is entirely a matter of my *private virtue*. With every access of self-consciousness I regenerate and revitalize my democratic way of life. Not by ancestor worship, not by the worship of god whom I refuse to see as my own, but by the worship of my all as my own soul do I get a glimpse of the heroic view of what it means to be human. It is comforting to realize that I shall always want excellence until my mind's eye grows strong enough to see that I already have it.

American Union

"But I wish to be distinctly understood on one point. Americanism is a question of spirit, convictions and purpose, not of creed or birthplace."

Theodore Roosevelt

My ancient wise man placed the golden age of united mankind in the past. My modern man of science tends to place that golden age of unified humanity in the future. The only possible human age, of any description, is the present. The idea of human progress as an historic development involves the tempting illusion "comparison," and tends to obscure the view of existing human excellence. Particularly since Freud's discovery and systematic use of free association, individual man has found a method for realizing his golden age of conscious integration of his personal humanity.

The claim is sometimes made that the best critic, or observer, of American democracy might be an "outsider," one who lives some other government than democracy, a James Bryce or a de Tocqueville. This imagined superiority of an "outsider" must be based upon the self-deception that the best observer of an experience is one who has never consciously lived a like experience. It seems to me that the fully appreciated meaning of self-sovereignty can grow itself only where the opportunity for its conscious growth offers. The sanest traveller finds himself wherever he goes. The psychoanalyst travels a great deal, in his life only.

In his book, *America Comes Of Age*, André Siegfried described the doctrine of "efficiency in production" as the "central idea" of the American. He asserted, the American "Nation is not individualistic in mentality." He speaks of the American citizen as having become "a means rather than an end." Each of these charges is a grievous one declaring that self-consciousness is the desideratum, not the design, of the developed American mind.

The ideal of "service" is healthful to the extent that it is recognizable as self-service. A laborer who cannot see his work-a-day world as his own construction *within* him, suffers from the illusion of insignificantly drudging *in* an alien and inhuman world. United with his unified fellow creature by the only force which unites, rather than unties, namely, the force of personal identity, a consciously free person observes this union within himself as an act of his own life, an energetic growing self-expression. Even "brotherhood" is en-

tirely inadequate to express the true *identity* a man lives when he experiences his fellowman. All that he grows, and most notably his fellowman, is a living *nisus* in his life. Every psychoanalyst knows that the health importance of self-consciousness suffers the most disregard in home, school, and all "social" living, and needs the tenderest care. Everyone must raise his own ideal of the possibilities of human nature, and he can do that only by discovering that there is more to himself than he formerly supposed.

The Majority Rule

"Any man more right than his neighbor, constitutes a majority of one."

Henry David Thoreau

As Aristotle said, man may be described as a political animal, that is, as one who is conscious of his need to live his fellowman peacefully. In the life process of his self-growth he cannot help but create (within himself) the unified identities known as his fellowmen. If he can see his life as *all* his own, he cannot help but sense that *his* fellowman's gain is his own gain. Provided that his functioning of self-consciousness can proceed freely, he will very soon come to recognize the necessity for self-governing contrivances, for ideal political condition in his life.

A democratic citizen must undergo all of the devices developed for making democracy work. He must alert himself not to lose his mind (forget himself) in his politics. Thus, he must see that *his* every committee can be only a committee of one, of himself. Each sufficiently self-conscious person growing himself as a committee member, sees that he lives *all* that occurs in *his* committee experience. He does not call majority rule a rule of some "external" force. His sensing his own identity in each one of his committee members, gives his majority vote a humanistic meaning which it could not possibly have otherwise.

Raymond Blaine Fosdick noted, "It is always the minorities that hold the key of progress; it is always through those

who are unafraid to be different that advance comes to human society." The citizen who sees the humaneness of majority rule may vote with the minority, but his comprehensive view of his human life clearly indicates to him that his majority has a greater right of human life on its side, and that this specific right makes all of the might in his majority. Furthermore, his awareness of the human life involved (his own) creates the necessity for his pacific solution of the overpowering weight of his human opposition, as of his every governmental problem.

The competency of majority rule is not, as Edmund Burke implied it to be, a "problem of arithmetic." Political equality is most natural. Universal suffrage itself is most desirable in the life of every human being. This fact is not less true because the great majority of human beings may be lacking in political insight. Recognized benefit of universal suffrage is needed so that there will be consciousness of the need for education.

It is not only the privilege but the duty of every American to be concerned about the efficiency of his government. No part of his democratic system can be wholesomely free from his personal scrutiny. William Henry Harrison affirmed, "A decent and manly examination of the acts of Government should be not only tolerated, but encouraged."

Equality

"All men are created equal"

Thomas Jefferson

Psychoanalytic research has confirmed this declaration of Jefferson's. Every man *is* born equal. Equal to whom, or what? Equal to himself, to be sure. In Putnam's Monthly of October 1853, a physician wrote, "The private judgment of the individual is the only safe criterion, and he should be answerable only to his own sense of right and wrong. This is the soul of our code of ethics. All that our associations and authoritative conventions demand, is, that each should concede to others this liberty of opinion. Such

is the republic of medicine - truest of all republics,, holding perfect individual freedom consistent with the safety of all."

Where can I find the residence of *my* fellow man if not within myself. To locate the abode of my governmental authority elsewhere than within me, is an acknowledgement of my inability to abide my governmental meanings with composure, an instance of my inability to feel equal to myself.

As Freud noted, there can be no consciousness other than self-consciousness.* My consciousness is my awareness

Process, published posthumously, 1940, Freud noted specifically the helpfulness in understanding particular conditions and disturbances affecting the "synthetic nature of the workings of the ego."

of my existence which identifies me inseparably with myself. My sense of my personal identity in all of my living, is my equalizer. My sense of equality (to my own living) is my sense of sanity. Without the functioning of my self-consciousness, I must live myself as irreconcilable diversities, as a body of contradictions, as a scatter-brain complaining that I am the butt of circumstances.

The central interest of every human life with regard to each of its experiences is, How can I regulate it and not have it regulate me? How can I extend my conscious self-sovereignty to comprehend it, and not have it seem to rule my life? How can I achieve self-control and not surrender to a tail-wagging-the-dog life orientation? How can I *feel* equal to living my own life? The idea behind this central interest of every human being is: I am the creator of all of my creations, any one of which threatens to become a frankenstein to the extent that I cannot see my very own identity in it, and thus see myself "grow equal" to it. *Equally*, every American citizen creates his own democratic government.

Despite the oft-made declaration that it cannot be clearly explained, or scientifically justified, there is nothing mysterious in the expression, "the equality of men," provided that such an idea of plurality is not used to repress the only human truth: the individuality of man. Nothing is, or can be,

*In his unfinished fragment *Splitting Of The Ego In The Defensive*

sanely explicable on the basis of "betweenness." Each man is his own *all*, and therefore must be equal only to himself (quite as his fellowman is his own all and must be equal only to his fellowman's self.) Equality means identity, sameness.

The complete, full-grown, American citizen is equal to realizing his "then" and "there" creations as self-observations. He sees how he can use "there" and "then" to repress *here* and *now*... He does not suffer from the illusion that the seat of his government is in one place and that he is in another place. He does not measure himself as an infinitesimal speck in a vast universe. He is neither a space-server nor a time-server, and thereby escapes all of the tangled webs which such self-deceptions as "space," "past," and "future" must weave.

The basic assumption in American government of the principle of equality, perhaps more than any other, offers a clear view of the humaneness of American citizenship. In all sanity, "equality" cannot mean that one person is in any sense equal to another person, or unequal for that matter. In the one sense that the whole is greater than any one of its parts, every American citizen must acknowledge that he is greater than *his* fellow citizen. It is rare for a human being to recognize that he is equal to himself but his awareness or lack of awareness of this truth has nothing to do with its actuality.

Every citizen capable of comprehending his fellow citizen as an existent within him, cannot but uphold his fellow citizen's claim to "equal protection of the laws." Every citizen who lives his fellow citizen as if he is not an existent within him, needs motivation other than that provided by his sense of personal identity for upholding his fellow citizen's right to "equal protection of the laws."

Usage has made the term citizen nearly synonymous with the term voter. Usage describes the citizen as a member of the body politic. It is well to see clearly the greatly limited helpfulness in such belittling designation of American citizenship. Actually the term *citizen* can mean only: One who duly acknowledges as his very own living of it the gov-

ernment indicated by his citizenship. In order for a citizen to grow the government of his choice as *his very own conscious living of it*, he must grow himself in such a way as to create this insightful living. To wit, he must meet the so-called requirement of citizenship: of seeing that he is equal to himself. Every citizen incapable of being aware that he must live his fellow citizen as himself, requires himself to live some kind of pacific power other than that which he can call his own will power. Usual designation of this imagined kind of pacific power is: police force.

Bentham's ideal was, "Every man his own lawyer." He carefully pointed out the reliable peace officers of human being: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do." One cannot but wonder, Would Kant, Rousseau, and many another one, have denied the dependability of self-interest as a reputable moral motive, had each one lived a democratic government? Yet Locke and Hobbes and innumerable others developed this insight without benefit of democratic citizenship. And Rousseau himself paradoxically began his *Social Contract*: "By what inconceivable art has a means been found of making men free by making them subject?"

Liberty

"Among freemen there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet."

Abraham Lincoln

Another key concept of conscious self-government is *freedom*. George Bernard Shaw to the contrary, American liberty is not just a monstrous idol "put up in New York Harbor." As Lincoln asserted, in giving freedom to the slave we assured freedom to the free. Every psychoanalyst by cultivating his free association has discovered the price of liberty is a specific kind of vigilance, namely, self-consciousness.

Scientifically expounded "political science" is presumed to encompass the whole order of modern social organization. All that it can ever possibly be is a set of meanings of an *individual* mind, psychic elements of the given mind considering it. Each self-imperceptive political scientist, however, must limit the word, "individualism," to mean: a social philosophy in political economy. At most, he may courageously concede "primacy," never its allness, to individuality.

Every American can thrill with life by reading the wonderful endorsements by Thomas Jefferson and John Adams of insightful Destutt de Tracy's treatise upon political economy founded upon free appreciation of citizen selfhood. Tracy apparently recognized that the stages of human development of greatest meaning are the stages in the extension of man's consciousness.

My personified "government" *cannot* grant or withhold the liberty of my free individuality through any extension or limitation of its so-called "political power." In no way can I impair my freedom. Whether I am living my inside or outside of a jail, my liberty (as my individuality) is inviolable. And as John Stuart Mill decided, it is "better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." By sensing fully this truth of my inviolable individuality I can see myself *de novo*, as ever natural and original, and avoid living myself as if I have a gang or society or an army or any other such phantasm "on my side" to help me. I know that I am selfish about it but I do enjoy seeing my fellowman look at himself in the same way. Any person who will make the necessary arrangements with himself (as often as possible) for cultivating his own self-consciousness, will make himself the strong healthy mind characteristic of the mature United States citizen. Psychoanalytic work and American citizenship training have the same goal: appreciation of human excellence. It is his self-consciousness, only, which gives man his unique power of valuing his wonderfulness. His language is a wonderful means for his securing definitive views of his abundance, but has no more "communication" value than has any other self-use.

Separation of Powers

"What do you suppose will satisfy the soul, except
to walk free and own no superior?"

Walt Whitman

American political sagacity distinctifies autonomy as much as possible. Thus, church and state are separate; medicine is practiced privately; home and school are respected as separate entities; local "grass roots" educational jurisdiction is respected; executive, judiciary, and legislative powers are autonomous; and so on.

Only my self-consciousness can enable me to see clearly that I have, or have not, reached a stage of my political development where I have sufficient civic wisdom to sense my responsibility as a voter, separate in the sense of belonging to myself. The level (and standard) of my politics is essentially the level of my realization that my public interest is entirely a private interest of mine, for instance, that my spoils-based political organization is nothing but my personal living of it.

Specializing in my conscious individualism (if I do), I benefit from this intensely personal localism in innumerable governmental ways, every one of which reveals the full truth of autonomy. To illustrate, if I am content to live only a *part* of my government, such as my "Supreme Court," as having the power to control the constitutional guarantees of the liberty of *all* of me, I clearly suffer an impairment of mental vision about what *autonomy* means. The necessity for separation of each and every power, and hence the advantage in observing such "separation," is the product of extensive (rather than limited) self-consciousness.

Free self interest discovers that education for American citizenship involves a kind appreciation and tender treatment of dangerous unconscious personifications such as "political pressure," "the Press slanting the news," "drugged individualism," "racketeering," "everybody for himself and the devil take the hindmost," "kickbacks," "stockwatering," "jury packing," "judicial spoils," "all the traffic will bear,"

"the state," "big business," "the corporation," "the school board," "supreme court," and so on and on. Observing such views as nothing but my own life's expressions, is all that can save me from a self-unconscious life of verbalism (of illusional "communication").

A prized possession of every American citizen is his governmental system of "checks and balances," made possible by the separation of powers. The most practical application of this democratic instrument is its usefulness in seeing to it that the "professional" does not ignore his identity with his fellow citizen who is a layman. Thus, every American maintains his sense of authority with regard to his professional educator, statesman, soldier, and so on; and, each "professional" maintains his sense of identity with his fellow citizen the layman.

Obviously the professional scientist, by the simple means of making a tabu of the "personal" in science, circumvented this system of checks and balances. Then fortified with his own broken principle that dislike must not bias his acceptance of truth, he proceeded to dissociate his scientific self from his identity with his fellow laymen. Scientific lethal weapons now threaten the preservation of human existence.

Public Education

Only they have come of age who have
learned how to educate themselves.

J. L. Spalding

Thomas Jefferson saw that each American citizen must educate himself to become capable of declared self-government. By the way he lives himself each citizen gets his mind into a certain shape which constitutes his "system of psychology." His system of psychology underlies and shapes his system of education.

Jefferson regarded ignorance as "that greatest enemy of man's freedom and happiness." In Bernard Mayo's words, "He fully, and passionately, subscribed to the view that what happens to American education will eventually happen to

the American nation. . . . His educational plans were adopted by other states, and were so influential that they have been called 'the charter of the American public school system'."

Free-mindedness is the only real freedom of every American. Authoritarianism in education at any stage of human development, from the nursery on, defeats each pupil's educational power to develop his capacity for conscious self-government. Living self-consciously, is the most helpful in-service training program for each American teacher. Jefferson's program of free public education beginning with the elementary school and continuing in the university had as a chief purpose the safeguarding of democracy from being a breeding ground of demagogues. The extension of American public education is truly wonderful provided that it stands for each pupil's educating himself about himself.

American Diplomacy

"The man who will not investigate both sides of a question is dishonest."

Abraham Lincoln

Every American citizen may comfort himself regarding the helpfulness of his professional democratic diplomat by reading Henry M. Wriston's interesting little book, "Diplomacy in a Democracy."* The American diplomat, whose mind is disciplined in sensing his identity in his fellowman, has the most powerful means of understanding that is possible. It is this kind of readiness for world citizenship which is the most urgent need of my world today. As Abraham Lincoln said, the Declaration of Independence "gave liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time."

The great seal of the United States carries in Latin the motto: a new order of the world. The American diplomat who has trained his mind to observe that his world is his own, and that his every fellowman's world is his own, has

*Harper & Brothers, New York, 1956

in mind the program for peace through this wisdom of self-appreciation. The cure for each complaint about democracy continues to be more democracy. The conversion of "They" and "We" into "I" epitomizes democratic diplomacy. As President Eisenhower observed, "The great struggle of our times is for the hearts and souls of men — their very inmost souls. If we are going to be strong we must be strong in spirit." "We must be devoted with all our heart to the values we defend. We must know that each of these values and virtues applies with equal force at the ends of the earth and in our relations with our neighbors next door."

A great American diplomat, James Russell Lowell, recorded, "It is by presence of mind in untried emergencies, that the native metal of a man is tested." Presence of mind is founded only upon self-consciousness. The illusion "relativity" is the product of repression of individuality. It is not possible for individuality to be relational. David Ricardo expressed clearly the kind of political insight enjoyed by Adam Smith, James Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and many another self-reliant independent, "The pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the whole." Thomas Hill Green also said it well, "the self is a social self." And Solon knew, "That is the most perfect government under which a wrong to the humblest is an affront to all."

War is the issue of declared irresponsibility created by repressed individuality. Thus every war has been over the control of "property" unrecognized as self-property. Machiavelli accounted for war accurately as the State's (nobody's) prerogative in its right to preserve and augment its power. The locus of state sovereignty is nowhere, a most difficult place to find for the fixing of responsibility. Equipped with this insight, the American diplomat is most effective as an ambassador of peace and good will. Self-consciousness confers the needed talent and tact of statesmanship.

Basically, there are but two possible governments, conscious self-government of democracy and unconscious self-government of dictatorship. Diplomatic expediency may,

and often does, require renunciation of one's wish to have everyone of his world enjoy the self-benefits of democratizing his living, every individual's democratization being a life process which must grow from within only.

Summary

Of my friends I am the only one I have left.

Terence

The one essential ingredient of healthful government is that it be heeded perseveringly as a conscious self-development, both in its spirit and in its method. "Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human *wants*," said Burke. "Human" implies self-interest. Conscious self-cultivation enables adequate American citizenship training. Whatever I consciously will to live, is American in the truest sense of the word. Self-willed growth of self-knowledge, is my definition of scientific education. No other kind of "consistent nomenclature" ("classified knowledge") can provide an adequate "scientific" substitute for the scientific exactness provided by duly observed self-experience. For me to deny my personal identity in my government, as in any of my "external" world, provides, in Freud's words lifted from his immortal essay on *Negation*, "a kind of intellectual acceptance of what is repressed, though in all essentials the repression persists."

The consideration of the cultured mind is an issue second to none in human importance, not only on account of the fact that it decides the range of that mind but, more vitally significant, it sets the limits of appreciation of life itself. Insight into the nature of my most helpful way of identifying myself, is both my most comprehensive and my most practical insight. Self-consciousness is free mindedness. The kind of "scientific mindedness," which I consider to be ideal, is entirely favorable to my free (conscious) creation of my imaginings.

Language is not a form of magic, not some kind of mystic word complex, which enables "communication."

"Communication" is a myth, an ever popular fairy tale nearly always unrecognized as such. The real function of language is to help the individual organize his life, direct his power, and understand himself. He lives all of his own world. One person cannot understand another. The use of language in free association is the most effective way devised thus far for extending self-understanding (by extending self-consciousness.) I can not "impart" my language to another, any more than I can impart my speech or hearing, dumbness or deafness, to him. Linguistics are symbols of meaning and meaning occurs nowhere except in an individual mind. As Freud said, meaning is psychic value.

Self-understanding reveals the sovereignty of human individuality, exposing all government as self-government. From the truth of human individuality derives all of "the higher law." All "due process of law" is each individual's mental process. All of his "language of politics" is each individual's instrument of thought, categorized as "politics."

Lastly, it has been my intention to speak of my American government as of myself. Sagely observed Madame de Staël, "To divide, in order to comprehend, is a sign of weakness in philosophy; as to divide, in order to rule, is a sign of weakness in political power."

In the sense that it represents the only trustworthy method for setting up and maintaining government based upon the only real sovereignty, namely, that of the human individual, democracy is the true American ideal way of life. It is indeed rare for an American citizen to attain this kind of civic insight, but this painful observation in no way detracts from the factual worth of full measured conscious self-possession and conscious self-government.

Particularly with respect to one's highest ideals, it is prudent to observe that opposites exist side by side in the human mind. Power is as power does. Claimed support for the sufficiency of human individuality may be used to cover a multitude of attempts at violation of human individuality. Although surely a democratic rule in its intention, it is certainly true that the "rule of the majority" can operate as

a kind of mob rule. Furthermore, it must operate thus as (an illusional) "mob rule" to the extent that each voter is not consciously devoted to the overall human truth of the sovereignty of his (including *his* fellow citizen's) human individuality.

In order that a political writer may distinguish himself in his treatment of the *essence* of the democratic ideal of living, it is essential that he understand the meaning of freedom itself. For that understanding, he must be able to renounce the fear of *unrelieved* human individuality. By "unrelieved individuality" is meant: that comprehension of human creaturehood which conceives it to be its own everything, its own all, its own universe. In his famous literary exchange with Walter Lippman, Archibald MacLeish, mind-conscious and self-conscious American citizen that he is, stated this case with the wonderful unity of expression which is conferred only by conscious mental integration.* "Ever-increasing consciousness, which means ever-increasing individual consciousness, which means ever-increasing individuality, is the law of human gravity and it cannot be reversed." Again, "Man's journey is a journey from the remote insensibility of the jelly of his biological beginnings toward the fulfillment of consciousness, and the fulfillment of consciousness is an individual, not a herd, achievement." And, again, "We no longer assume the superior reality of the public world of objective reason. We assume instead the deeper reality of the world within - which is to say, the world which each human individual uniquely is." And, finally, "The postulates which will give us peace are not the postulates which satisfy us on another coast. They are the postulates which will express our life beyond - our life as individual human beings set free to be ourselves."

Poet, psychoanalyst, and mature American patriot, - each

* MacLeish and Lippman, *On the Public Philosophy*, Perspectives, PP. 160-162, No. 14, Winter 1956, Intercultural Publications Inc. of New York. Published in Great Britain by Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 90 Great Russell Street, London, W.C.1.

one identifies his manpower with this conscious self-knowledge: 1) consciousness is the humanizing power of man, and 2) all consciousness is *self* consciousness.

Wayne State University
College of Medicine
Detroit 7, Michigan

Some Character Aspects of the Satirist (Pietro Aretino)

by

Maurice N. Walsh, M. D.

According to Garnett, (1) satire was first exercised in gibing at personal defects and with later advance in literary art it became dignified as an instrument of morality, and often the associate of poetry. The first master of satire, Archilochus of the Seventh Century, B.C., seems to have been the first to elevate this "instrument of private animosity" as Garnett (1) calls it, to an element of public life. Literary commentators on satire and satirists usually seem to believe that the satirist's strictures on the important personages and mores of his time really refer to private grudges of the writer. Of Archilochus himself it is recorded that he was embittered because of grinding poverty, and because he was refused the daughter of Lycambes in marriage; and that he threw away his shield in battle and fled and was as a result exiled for cowardice - all most unfortunate life experiences and unlikely to be compatible with pleasant feelings.

That satirists have produced works of great literary and artistic merit, some of which have had important results in promoting social betterment there can be no doubt. Again, however, literary commentators seem to repeatedly express doubts that the satirist was really very much interested in abolishing political and social abuses, but rather in attracting attention to himself or even in securing some sort of impregnable political, social or financial position, and at times by rather disreputable means. Green (2) observed that it never occurred to the Roman satirists to suggest that the vicious patron-client system then in vogue was inherently degrading and should be abolished; they merely wanted more pre-

requisites for the clients. As George Orwell observed of a later satirist, Charles Dickens, he did not want to abolish the Bumbles; he merely wanted bigger, better, kindlier Bumbles.

In spite of this lack of a moral centre, however, satirists have had an important function in making known political and social abuses and evils and thus preparing the way for their eventual modification. Kanzer (3) has noted that the appearance of Cervantes, Voltaire and Gogol on the national scene in their respective cultures and ages could be thought of as warnings of latent revolutionary forces, which the works of these satirists notably stimulated. Kanzer remarked on what appeared to be a curious interplay between the wittiness of these individuals and their paranoid traits and elements of discontent in the population.

Trilling, (4) a literary man, in discussing the much debated question as to what the psychoanalyst can contribute to the study of literature, correctly states that the analytical method can do two things; namely to elucidate the "inner meanings" of the literary work and secondly to explain the temperament of the artist as a man. To this I would add that the psychoanalytical method has, for the first time in history, opened the way to a real clarification of the relationship between the character structure of the author and specific elements in his artistic productions.

Psychoanalytic studies of persons who lived from the Twentieth, to the Sixteenth Centuries have been published and are available for comparison. The works of the satirists Shaw, (5) Schnitzler, (6) Gogol, (3) and Carroll, (7) and Swift, (7) when studied from the viewpoint of the psychoanalytic method, permit some understanding of the personality structures of these individuals and of the influence thereof on their literary work. Psychoanalytic studies of the artists Michelangelo (8) and Beethoven, (9) and one of the religious reformer Luther (10) show that the essential nature of neurotic conflict has not changed with the centuries. In the same way that a study of human individuals from human societies of less differentiated, earlier types and periods has

shed much light upon present day societies and individuals, the possibility was considered that a study of the works and recorded life of a satirist from the time of the Renaissance, the early Sixteenth Century, might have some relevance for our understanding of satirists of the present time. This does not of course mean that conclusions gained in this way can be directly applied to men now living, any more than one can directly and uncritically apply conclusions derived from the study of primitives to present day, well acculturated city dwellers in America or Europe. However psychoanalytic studies of the recorded lives and works of men living in past centuries, where sufficient material survives for such studies, have demonstrated the important fact that the essential characteristics of the human personality are unchanging with time. That is to say that in its essential features the human unconscious is as timeless and unchanging as in living individuals studied psychoanalytically today.

Satire in its literary aspect is defined in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1) as "... the expression in adequate terms of the sense of amusement or disgust excited by the ridiculous or unseemly, provided that the humour is a distinctly recognizable element and the utterance is invested with literary form." But it also recognizes that satire expresses more than this, because the feeling of disgust is specifically mentioned as one of affective motives for its production. Through psychoanalytic research we know that disgust is one of the prominent motives of defense against unconscious oral demands, a fact that connects it with guilt feelings. Fenichel (11) pointed out that certain feelings of disgust are very similar to guilt feelings, i.e. disgust with oneself. There is also an obvious connection with anal eroticism, arising from a reaction formation to the early anal-erotic interest of the child in his feces. The archaic forerunner of disgust is the physiological pattern of spitting out something repulsive and therefore inedible that reaches the digestive tract.

In view of this one is entitled to wonder whether the amusement referred to in the definition may not actually be

related to something painful perceived in the external or internal reality, i.e. that the satirist may be in some way similar to the person who does not know whether to laugh or to cry as a reaction to some painful or threatening person or situation, but who manages to make something ridiculous and absurd out of the situation; to burlesque it, to clown, to mimic in a facetious way, to excite laughter in others. In this way he may try to deny the pain of the reality situation and to substitute a pleasurable sensation for it, this process being aided by the arousal in others with whom he can identify, through his amusing burlesque and absurd clowning.

Reich, (1) Brenman (13) and Skinner (14) have clarified the personality problems of those persons who tend to mimic and ridicule the behavior of others, and have shown that this behavior actually represents an attempt to master anxiety through magical means. The threat from other persons is reduced by a superficial identification with them, thus introjecting them and then rendering them ridiculous, i.e. harmless and amusing like children.

Freud (15) demonstrated that wit is a defence against reality, the rational being denied and the unconscious wish being permitted to evade censorship and to become conscious, as in dreams, to which wit is closely allied. Psychoanalytic study of dreams has shown that in them absurdity signifies embittered criticism while the comic often represents an attack on persons or institutions otherwise commanding respect. Such tendencies are present in all humans, but become particularly evident and symptomatically significant in individuals with personality disturbances, in whom their origins are more easily perceived because the loosening of inhibitions renders them more conspicuous.

Sigmund Freud (16) was the first to demonstrate that an author's literary productions, when subjected to psychoanalytic study, could yield information concerning the author's unconscious motivations and conflicts; and that, when supplemented with biographical data, diagnostic conclusions regarding his personality structure and predominant ego defenses could be inferred. He showed that authors

tend to demonstrate to some degree their infantile fantasies as well as their ego defenses in their writings as well as in the recorded actions of their lives.

The pathological entities loosely spoken of today as character disorders with paranoid, depressive, psychopathic, narcissistic or other trends cannot be assumed to have arisen solely in modern times. The behavior of many historical figures in all ages of recorded history bears a close resemblance to that observed in patients with the above diagnoses today; but it was not until society had attained sufficient permissiveness and a cultural level sufficiently high to allow a sufficiently free literary expression that written material which is significant from the psychoanalytic standpoint could be obtained. This was first attained by the Greek society of the Fifth Century, B. C. The portrayal by Thucydides (17) of the behavior of the Alkibiades permits us to suspect the presence of a severe psychopathic character disorder in this brilliant and gifted man.

A loosening of the rigid and restrictive social control, which prevailed during the medieval period, characterized the period of the Renaissance, which began in Italy. The Renaissance represented a period of marked social change. The individual gained in importance and, as Hanns Sachs (18) pointed out, a new conception of the human individual and his body as well as a new attitude toward the world came into being. This represented a new distribution of narcissism, and a return to the ancient Greek idea that the present life was important, and not a hypothetical life after death. Thus attention to the human individual, his soma and psyche, his hopes, fears and aspirations characterized this period. This change in attitude gave a tremendous impetus to literature and art.

Pietro Aretino (19) is an example of an author of the Italian High Renaissance who was extremely well known in his day and who may be said to have had an important influence upon the development of the modern scene, yet who has been largely forgotten outside of literary historical circles. He was in a way the early Sixteenth Century fore-

unner of Gabriele d'Annunzio in that he was a flamboyant literary lion and a well-known ladykiller, as well as a quasi-political figure in his time.

Pietro Aretino's reputation was European and his works were translated into many languages. It is interesting to notice that they reached the Tudor Court in London where they played their part in starting the vogue of Italianizing so characteristic of the Elizabethan literary scene. In addition to producing the phenomenon of the "inglese italianato", who according to the Renaissance proverb was "un diavolo incarnato", Aretino also had an important effect on Elizabethan drama. The playwrights Greene, Webster, Ben Jonson, Ford and even Shakespeare were to some degree influenced by his work and represented his successors.

Writings unfamiliar to a modern audience, the comedies of Aretino have been spoken of by Fresno (20) as the only vital contribution to the Italian theater before Goldoni, apart from Machiavelli's "Mandragola", while his tragedy "Orazio" is still a classic. The six volumes of Aretino's letters (21) contain approximately four thousand pages of begging, fawning and flattery which now give the impression of being unfelt, artificial and dead. However, there are four or five hundred additional pages which are very readable and probably could be included in a collection of some of the very best writings of the period of the Renaissance. He also wrote several religious works, the insincerity of which he himself acknowledged.

The "Raggionamenti delle Corte" (22) or "the Reasonings of the Courts", also known as "Dialogi Ameni" or "Pleasant Dialogues", constitute the most famous writings of Aretino, undoubtedly due to their lewd reputation rather than to any real merit they might have. It has been pointed out, however, that the lewd nature of this work has made its proper appraisal difficult and has overshadowed its real value.

Pietro Aretino was easily one of the most remarkable and contradictory personalities in the history of literature. Although he was an intimate friend of the great painter Titian

and of Sansovino, one of the greatest architects of the Renaissance, he was universally recognized in his lifetime as a talented scoundrel and an acknowledged parasite who lived by attacking great and powerful men and accepting rewards from several at the same time, selling out to each one in turn and then, for a higher price, turning and rending his erstwhile patrons. His career was long and malodorous. He was feared by the great because what he wrote about them was largely true, and his facility of expression was so great and his mind so keen and alert that his finest writings were considered by his contemporaries to be among the classics of his era. His infinite charm was recognized and helped him to escape punishment for the biting, satirical comments on political affairs and the misconduct of high officials, which he was fond of writing.

Hutton, (23) a recent biographer of Pietro Aretino, referred to him as the first yellow journalist. Titian called him "*Il condottiers delle lettere*" (the mercenary general of letters), shrewdly estimating both his moral and practical values in a single, highly descriptive term. Early in his adult life he had acquired a thoroughly bad reputation and was widely feared. He was known as the "*Scourage of Princes*" because of his fearful verbal attacks on rulers of states.

Pietro Aretino was born in 1492, the year that was distinguished both by the discovery of America and by the death of Lorenzo "*Il Magnifico*" de Medici, both events heralding a new era in history. His father was an obscure cobbler of Arezzo. His mother was a *cittadina*, a daughter of the tenements, whose name was Pita. After her death, Aretino wrote of her great beauty, and was proud of the fact that an artist called Matteo Lappoli had painted her as the Madonna in a fresco of the Annunciation for the Church of St. Agostino. Pietro took this as proof of the modesty and virtue of his mother "because of the very tender love he had of her memory" and he wished Vasari to make a copy of the picture so that he would be able to take the same pleasure from seeing her painted as he did when she was still alive. He claimed that Titian had told him that in his long

experience he had only seen one face less worldly than than of his mother. Yet in view of this statement it is remarkable that Aretino left home early and maintained essentially no relations with his mother after early adolescence, while he depreciated women and degraded them all his life.

Pietro was the only boy in his family, there being in addition two younger sisters. The only known relatives were two uncles, but whether they were brothers of the mother or father cannot be said. One was a priest and the other a lawyer, and they were said to have tried to help the growing boy follow in their footsteps rather than in those of his father. Pietro became an apprentice in the shop of his father and was said to have received at least the elements of a formal education. At the age of fourteen he left home to wander. The letters of Aretino written later in his life tell about the meanness and misery, the indignity and the humiliations he suffered during this period.

At the age of twenty Aretino brought out his first book which consisted of love songs, sonnets and comic poems. In 1516 he returned to Rome with no other belongings than the rags which he wore. Here he became a servant of Agostino Chigi, the wealthy banker. While here his first outstanding literary success was achieved through the writings of the burlesque last will and testament of the gift elephant of which Pope Leo X was so fond. This brought him to the attention of Pope Leo, who asked for his services as a kind of court literary jester, which position Aretino enjoyed greatly. With the early death of Pope Leo, an event which profoundly influenced Aretino's life, he found a new opportunity in the usual scandals attendant on the election of a new Pope.

In the Piazza Navona in Rome stood an ancient status lacking arms and legs and a nose. It was possibly originally a status of Hercules but Renaissance Rome christened it Pasquino after a sharp tongued and outspoken man of the time. Verses satirizing the various candidates for the Papal dignity began to appear pasted to the statue of Pasquino and a scurrilous jibe became known as a "Pasquinata."

Pasquino became the scandal sheet of Aretino. His effusions were biting and filled with acid humor and contained well directed thrusts striking out at cardinals and persons of power and influence. He called attention to one cardinal's homosexual interest in small boys, to another's indecorous interest in women, to another's overbearing mother, to the avarice of still another and to the verbosity of Allesandro Farnese. The election of the austere Dutchman, Pope Hadrian VI, put an end to the literary and artistic interests of the Papal court. Hadrian ordered that those who slandered him through Pasquino be apprehended, and Aretino fled. This was not the first time that his anxiety caused him to create a situation which brought retribution upon him, and as a result of which he had to flee, as Sterba's (8) demonstrated in the case of another more talented contemporary - Michelangelo Buonarroti.

Aretino reacted to the death of Pope Leo as if he had lost a good father, whose abandonment he could not forgive, and his aggressive attacks on the cardinals and Pope Hadrian made at this period of his life, seem related to his rage at the rage toward the miserly or greedy survivors of his benefactor, because of their refusal to give him gifts and to praise and appreciate him.

By this time he had acquired a certain fame as a political pamphleteer, and thus he was able to ask for the protection of Cardinal Guilio de Medici. He attached himself through the Cardinal's influence to the extraordinary Giovanni delle Bande Nere de Medici, the great soldier of the Medici clan. Giovanni delle Bande Nere was known as "Il Gran Diavolo" because of his military prowess as well as his interest in women and his habit of preying on the peasantry for the entertainment of his troops. Pietro Aretino promptly became a favorite with this prince, another of a series of relationships with men of power and prominence. In these relationships Aretino strove to convince powerful and wealthy men of his affection and faithfulness, while he sought preferment and favors from them, and he alternately abased himself before them and boasted to others of his great power

and influence over his patrons. He behaved in relation to these powerful men like a little boy who wishes affection from his father but who, because of his anxiety, must defiantly boast of his omnipotence and his ability to overcome the father in order to be able to cope with his fear of being ruthlessly dominated, mutilated and killed by the powerful father figure.

Giovanni delle Bande Nere de Medici toward whom the Pope was not friendly, was soon killed in trying to prevent the penetration into Italy of French and Swiss mercenary troops on their way to the sack of Rome, and Aretino had to find himself another patron. It was characteristic of him and illustrative of his ambivalence that at the same time that he applied for permission to be restored to the good graces of Pope Clement he virulently attacked the Pope by writing a scurrilous article, in which he posed as an oracle and predicted disgraceful actions and events for the coming year, which were attributed by him to the pope's shortcomings.

He did not stop at this but managed to bring punishment on himself for a far more serious offense which the Pope could not possibly overlook. It seems that the painter Giulio Romano, who was working in the Vatican in the room left unfinished by Raphael, left off his serious painting and for the amusement of his friends painted sixteen bawdy pictures. These pictures have not survived except in the engravings of Marc Antonio Raimondi of Bologna. The artist Giulio Romano was immediately thrown into prison by the Pope.

Aretino, wishing as always to show his influence over powerful people, went to the Pope and was successful in securing Romano's release. But again Aretino was unable to tolerate the anxiety set free by his illustration of his power over a father figure. His next step was to write sixteen filthy sonnets, one for each of the engravings, which immediately became equally famous with the engravings. Too late Aretino realized that he had made a blunder and issued a remarkable defense published as a letter to the physician Bat-

tista Lappi. In this defense he stated that he saw no harm in artists portraying human love-making, and compared himself to the unknown sculptor who had created the antique marble satyr trying to violate a boy which at that time was to be found in the Chigi Palace.

It can be no accident that he sought to justify his frank portrayal of sexual scenes by comparing himself to the sculptor of a statue portraying a homosexual attack by a satyr, an animal-man who was forcing a boy to have sexual relations with him, thus demonstrating Aretino's own unconscious homosexual fear of being attacked and raped as well as his defense by aggressive attack. The chief character of one of Aretino's plays "*Il Marescalco*" was a pederast, and in this connection it is pertinent to notice that Aretino himself was on one occasion openly accused by the government of Venice of a homosexual attack on a small boy and had to flee to avoid prosecution. The charge was finally dropped, ostensibly because of his fame and popularity; the other possibility being that it was untrue and had been brought against him by enemies. Whether or not Aretino was an overt homosexual is relatively unimportant since his literary works and life demonstrate abundant evidence of his tendency to regress, under the pressure of anxiety, to passive homosexual tendencies, which he defended himself against by aggressive action.

Aretino also accused critics of his lewd sonnets of being hypocrites who saw filth in natural processes, a charge which actually applied to himself. He claimed that there was no harm in the portraying of sexual scenes by artists and wrote that the very beasts were more free than humans, and that it would be proper for the phallus to be worn as an ornament pendant on a necklace or on the hat, since it had been responsible for the creation of all living humans, and actually is more noble than the hands or the mouth which do so many terrible things, thus graphically portraying his own exhibitionistic trends. After writing this effusion he again fled to escape the imprisonment which he had himself provoked because of his mobilized anxiety.

Aretino's most famous literary work, "*I Raggionamenti*" was written following the death of Giovanni delle Bande Nere, the Medici prince who was his patron. It is noteworthy that in this work the principal characters are all women, consisting of two prostitutes and the daughter of one of them whom the mother is considering placing in the same profession. This is a brilliant but bitter and satirical work in which the prostitutes discuss how men can be attacked, degraded and deceived by women, no matter in what walk of life they may find themselves. One of the prostitutes, Nana, is clearly an aggressive phallic woman who constantly takes the male role away from men. It is probably significant that another of the three prostitutes portrayed in his work was called Pippa, while Aretino's mother's name was Pita.

It seems clear that this work was written under the impact of powerful resentment at abandonment by a father figure. The fact that Giovanni delle Bande Nere had probably been killed as a result of the machinations of Pope Clement, another father figure, probably added to Aretino's helplessness rage at his loss. The portrayal of Nana as a phallic mother seems to represent an effort to make the mother figure supply the absence of the beloved father, that is to take over both roles, as well as to deny and attempt to ward off the castration anxiety aroused by the death of the admired prince, a father figure, through the providing of the mother figure with masculine attributes. Aretino's initial reaction to the loss of his beloved protector, the prince de Medici, seemed to have been a kind of panic in which he viciously attacked everyone, including popes, cardinals, powerful people and society. Then occurred a repression of this dissociated ego-alien impulse and its replacement by a more ego-syntonic literary creative striving. His literary work seems to represent an attempt to communicate threatening personal conflicts. His original hostile attitude toward father figures together with his fear of retaliation from stronger men is well represented in "*I Raggionamenti*" as in many of his works. There appears to be some projected ego recog-

dition of his break through of ancient guilt and fear which caused him to portray in this distorted way his early family situation.

In most of Aretino's work is to be found the tendency to ridicule the great, to clown, to provoke admiration, to render situations and people absurd and ridiculous, and to arouse amusement at his wit and anger at his insults. We know that this type of behavior is a reaction to anxiety, which may lead the neurotic individual to alternately fawn or to play the clown and to viciously needle and verbally attack others. No device was too crude to be used by Aretino for the purpose of calling attention to himself and securing praise for his wit and brilliance. In his previously mentioned prophecy or "Giudizio" he managed to insult and malign in a witty washion not only the Pope, but also the Emperor Charles V and most of the powerful nobles of Europe. As a result of a break through of his anxiety he finally had to flee from Rome and to take permanent refuge in Venice the one city of Renaissance Italy where free speech was permitted.

In this safe refuge he set up his headquarters in a palace, surrounded himself with prostitutes, and embarked upon a career of riotous living, supporting himself by issuing literary works in which he alternately threatened and fawned upon the powerful and wealthy crowned heads and nobles of Europe. These men and women behaved as if they feared him, and actually paid him to hold his tongue or to attack their enemies instead of themselves. Even a vengeful attempt at assassination by the Papal datary, in which he was severely wounded, was not sufficient to keep him quiet. His generosity became proverbial, and he dispensed hospitality with a tremendously lavish hand, and from his safe retreat he continuously needled the powerful with witty barbs and obscene innuendos. He wrote plays, sonnets, essays and pamphlets in a steady stream. He forced his way into an acquaintance with persons prominent in the principal society not only of Italy ut of all Europe.

In Venice, Aretino became obese and presided over his

harem of prostitutes and their children with the benign air of a pater-familias. As he became older his interest turned to younger and younger women. When on a few occasions a favorite innamorata proved unfaithful and deserted him for a younger man he reacted violently and his rage, always expressed in works of literature, demonstrated the deep narcissistic wound he had received. He wrote and indeed behaved as if he had been deprived of part of his own body, and from psychoanalyses of narcissistic individuals we can be sure that for him these women represented nothing more than narcissistic objects with whom he acted out his conflicts in order to avoid experiencing the painful feeling associated with them.

There is some reason to believe that Aretino actually encouraged his innamorata to prove unfaithful to him by importing handsome young men into his palace, again inconsistently destroying a relationship which, he vehemently protested, meant as much as life itself to him. He protested too loudly and too much at his loss, and it seems probable that it was his deep feelings of worthlessness which led him to unconsciously provide his women friends with occasions to be unfaithful to him, in order to anticipate their eventual abandonment of him; since his outrageously extravagant self praise suggests that he really could not believe himself worthwhile and potent enough to hold their affections. The chaotic nature of his behavior probably represents an avoidance of orderliness in his life, undoubtedly in order to avoid facing his problems in an orderly way; because of his deep fears of being rejected by everyone as an inferior, unworthy, despicable individual. He appeared to be continually and unconsciously trying to reproduce some repressed traumatic situations from his childhood in order to gain a belated mastery of them. His whole life appeared to have been dominated by his need to act out his repressed conflicts in disguised ways. His tendency to burlesque and make ridiculous every life situation as shown in his literary works and in his life, had the same dynamic origin, and represented an attempt to ward off anxiety, to abase himself and to portray

himself as a buffoon, in order to gain some acceptance, and to assume in anticipation a role into which he feared he would eventually be forced.

The works of Aretino give evidence of his peculiar attraction to women, seeing them always as enticing, faithless and to be despised and yet, always attractive and interesting. The theme of a woman as the prostitute, which occurs repeatedly in Aretino's plays, suggests a peculiar attitude towards women's bodies with which psychoanalysts are very familiar. This implies an attitude towards the sexual organs of women as a sewer in which waste products are to be dumped and in which the man is to derive his pleasure with no thought for the woman as a person. This has to do with the confused observation and speculations of early childhood, as noted by Freud, (24, 25) and it suggests that in Aretino's life there was little or no opportunity for correction of this attitude or for the attainment of any real ease and familiarity with feminine persons in the family relationship or in later childhood. Aretino's frenzied efforts to associate himself and to be at ease with women actually covered a deep withdrawal from them, and a denial of some of the tender life experiences related to women, that is those with children. The exaggerated demonstration of affection which he showed to his children again covered the same type of withdrawal.

Aretino needed the praise and approval of important and powerful people since he needed to be constantly reassured of his acceptability and his masculinity, which actually he must have doubted. We know by analogy with numerous psychoanalyses of narcissistic character disorders that he had to manipulate others in order to attract attention to himself, thus trying to deny and disprove his fear of being a despised individual worthy only to be exploited by others. It was important for him to provoke others so as to work them up to a high emotional pitch in order to avoid experiencing painful feelings himself. From these psychoanalyses we know that it is necessary for persons with this disorder to magically control important people in whatever manner they

can as proof of their omnipotence and power, in order to ward off their actual fear of helpless passivity, of being overcome, raped or killed.

In attempting to understand something of the emotional conflict of an author through a survey of his literary works, the occurrence of recurrent themes is of major importance. In the works of Pietro Aretino certain themes constantly repeat themselves and it is impossible that this should be purely accidental. There is in all of his works, whether it be his letters, his comedies, his tragedy or even his religious work, a previously mentioned tendency to burlesque or to satirize life situations. This would seem to parallel his tendency to burlesque and make ridiculous situations in his own life. A profound vein of cynicism and depression runs through all of his literary productions and must have been an important dynamic factor in his character. This is best illustrated by the principal character in his comedy "The Hypocrite", who, at the end of the play after his cynical advice has been taken and the complicated difficulties of the family about whom the play revolves are settled says, "Let who will live, live. Let who is born be born without taking account of the rain or the sun. Whoever will be ruined, let him be ruined. Everything is nothing." In the same comedy, all professions are derided as false and deceiving; the lawyer lives without laws, the physician is an honored butcher, while poets, astronomers and philosophers are all derided and depreciated by the chief character who says at last "I don't do this to bite anyone, but I am, God help me, a man of insensitivity." In this play the one studious and dutiful character, a daughter of the chief character, says, "My studies give me no pleasure, they teach me rather to die than to live."

In every comedy of Aretino's with the possible exception of "Il Marescalco" there exist characters who continually and in a foolish manner run after women and deceive them in order to gain their amorous affection, and who avidly seek honor and money without justice. These men place too much confidence in others and are deceived by them. It is

clear that here Aretino is referring to well marked tendencies within his own personality, the existence of which he tried to deny by portraying them in the characters of his theatrical pieces.

The master who deceives, mistreats and abuses his servants occurs in most of the comedies. The vices of the men of wealth who threaten to hurt the servants whose faithfulness and honesty they do not recognize or compensate, is frequently and graphically portrayed. These men are shown as a mixture of ignorance and spitefulness. It seems likely that this is a reference to the sufferings of Aretino himself during his earlier years, when he was subjected to the wishes of cruel and unsympathetic masters, and still earlier to his parents; but reference is undoubtedly also made to tendencies within Aretino's own personality. The reputation for kindness toward unfortunate people and towards social inferiors, which Aretino worked so hard to set up, concealed strong sadistic tendencies, as shown by his inconsistent behavior towards people whom he brought into his household and then on occasion treated with great cruelty.

In various comedies is repeated the character of the malicious servant who deceives and maligns the master and extorts privilege from him, at the same time making the master ridiculous and victimizing him. For these servants the satisfaction of their sensual appetites is the most important aspect of their personalities. The pleasures of eating have for them an irresistible attraction. Related to these characters are those of courtiers which occur in several plays. These men are portrayed as deceitful persons whose only aim in life was to seek after pleasures through deceit and jokes at the expense of other people. Actually they are greedy and sensual. Fresco (20) considers these servants and courtiers to represent those men at the court of Pope Leo of whom Aretino was very jealous, and whose influence with the pope he resented. But again reference must be made to tendencies within the personality of Aretino himself, which he endeavored to deny by portraying them in the person of these despicable characters. The oral tendencies

portrayed in these characters can be easily shown to have been well marked in the character of Aretino himself.

It seems probable that Aretino endeavored to suppress and deny strong love feelings. It seemed to be increasingly difficult to do so and he was continually attempting to re-establish his defenses. Illness or suffering or complaint he seemed to feel a need to escape from. He reacted to this by acting, and the histrionic expression of grief provoked by the final illness of his paramour, which he was careful to let everyone know about, represented in effect an attempt to deny these feelings by acting them out instead of experiencing them.

Aretino was esteemed and feared by his men friends, who were attracted to him because of his fame, wit and intellect as well as through admiration for his successful defiance of powerful nobles. He was very possessive of these friends and fiercely revengeful of personal slights and criticism, so that many of this friendships were broken because of his shifting allegiances. His persisting friendships with Titian seems to have something to do with his necessity for a trusted confidant, since not many people can endure emotional stresses such as Aretino went through without the aid of a confidant. Aretino was definitely protective towards Titian. He secured many commissions for him from the crowned heads and nobles of Europe. He criticized his painting and his personal likes in a way that might not have been entirely appreciated by the great painter. Nevertheless, he tried to make himself essential to Titian as he did with Sansovino, for whom he obtained a remission of a sentence of imprisonment which followed the collapse of Sansovino's library at Venice. It seems that he was here trying to set up some kind of a personal relationship and to compensate for severe and powerful feelings of inferiority by acting the role of a tutor, mentor and benefactor of these gifted artists. Aretino considered himself a great artist, and often boasted that his name would live in the history of literature and of the world.

With crude and savage asocial behavior, Aretino ap-

peared to be continually "getting even" in an almost ritualistic way, as a revenge for the punishment of which he was made the victim in his early life; the revenge having to be deferred until he became powerful enough himself to carry it out. He had to attribute his own defects to others, as shown by the incident of his criticism of Michelangelo, the great painter. After having unsuccessfully tried to bully Michelangelo into giving him an original work of art, Aretino brutally attacked the artist in a letter, accusing him of irreligion, lascivious and indecent portrayal of holy subjects and blasphemy in his treatment of the themes portrayed in Michelangelo's famous Sistine frescos. The defenses of projection and denial are well illustrated in this as well as many other of his literary productions.

The glaring inconsistency of much of the behavior of Aretino is well illustrated in his literary works. He was strikingly cynical in regard to religion and in many works burlesqued the church and its people, an open defiance of authority in the world of his day. In his comedy "*La Cortigiana*" the comic character Maco, a simple fellow, goes to Rome with the intention of becoming a cardinal. The painter Andrea, a cynic, informs him that in order to become a cardinal he must first become a courtier, and subjects him to a variety of humiliating and degrading situations which he informs Maco are necessary to attain the end.

It is striking that in 1549 Aretino himself fell into the same trap as had the character Maco in his play. As a result of the flattery of various friends, among them Guidobaldo delle Rovere, Duke of Urbino, who may well have had his tongue in his cheek, Aretino proceeded to Rome in company with the Duke with the hope of receiving himself a cardinalate. This was not the first time that he aspired to such a dignity. Under the Papacy of Pope Clement VII he had been similarly disappointed by a Pope, although he was championed by no less a person than the Pope's own grandson Ottavio Farnese. Julius III was no more disposed than his predecessor to make himself ridiculous by creating a cardinal from such an infamous character as Aretino, and

thus he was forced to return to Venice without this coveted honor, after being kept in suspense for some months. Following his return Aretino tried to deny that he had ever desired a cardinalate, which cannot have been very convincing to his friends and acquaintances.

The naiveté and simplicity shown by him on this occasion strikingly resembles that of Maco in the comedy written by himself, and demonstrates the inability of Aretino to assume the role of a mature man in relation to the Pope, a powerful father figure. This was characteristic of his relationship to men of power, whom he wished to emulate and identify himself with, but in relations with whom he consistently failed. It seems clear that a regression occurred under these circumstances. Aretino continually tried to persuade the father figure to give him a gift of a portion of his omnipotence. The anxiety generated by this demand, however caused him to behave in a childishly naive and ridiculous manner, thus frustrating his own wish; just as takes place when the little boy tries to take the role of a grown-up man and meet the father in the role of an adult, for which he is not yet ready. His feelings on this occasion were given vent to in a significant dream which occurred at this time and is reported in an elaborated and literary form in a letter to Giovanni Battista Coppola. (21)

His loud and noisy acting out of his grief on the occasion of the death of his daughter indicated his need for denial and deep repression of his actual feelings. He had the capacity, characteristic of narcissistic character disorders, to turn away from his conflict and to recover balance through inner defensive maneuvers which then became projected into the external world through his acting out behavior and his literary work, employing narcissistic objects because of his inability to have relationships with individuals as persons and probably also because of his difficulty in finding a secure identity of his own.

Some evidence of his preoccupation with problems of identity occur in several of his works. An acute identity crisis is graphically described by Aretino in his play "The

Courtesan''. The character, Maco, a servant, is disguised as a laborer. He looks at himself in the mirror and cries, "I am changed, I am altered, I am dead. Mercy! I am not myself. I am disfigured. Traitors, you have changed my form. Miserable persons, give me back my own face and take back your own. . ." This passage appears to express anxiety in a paranoid way against a forced assumption of another identity which is thought of as equivalent to dying. Again in "The Hypocrite" Aretino portrays the confusion between brothers of very different temperaments, one of whom is constantly being mistaken and taking the place for another. In one of his letters, (21) Aretino refers to Titian as his other self saying, "He is I and I am he," and "Titian is my other self." A substitution of one person for another, thus creating confusion is a favorite dramatic device of Aretino. This would all seem to refer to Aretino's actual uncertainty regarding his own identity. The identity which Aretino seems to have employed for the most part, as far as one can conjecture from his literary works and what facts we know for certain about his life, was a negative identity as described by Erikson. (5) He behaved like a grown-up juvenile delinquent, continually skirting the edge of decency and at time indulging in outrageous obscenity and asocial and amoral behavior with marked voyeuristic and exhibitionistic tendencies. In relations with powerful authority figures he appeared to be continually seeking their favors and obsequiously begging for their admiration and gifts; while at the same time he needled, antagonized and tried to shock them by his inappropriate behavior. The glaring inconsistency of this behavior demonstrates its unconscious origin. In short, one gains the impression that this "negative personality" resembles that assumed by the child delinquent whose behavior reflects those aspects of behavior and attitude of which the parents disapprove rather than those of which they approve. One can be relatively certain that the mother who was painted as a Madonna in church could not approve of Aretino's behavior and his writings, with the possible exception of his religious writings, which he him-

self acknowledged in a letter were not sincere; and any possible beneficial affects of which he cancelled out by his scurrilous and obscene literary productions and by his open immorality. The influence of unconscious guilt in the behavior characteristic of this identity is strong, and the usual concomitant of self produced punishment and humiliation demonstrates its unconscious origin.

Another identity seems to have been that of the adult man as seen by a child in the phallic period. This was his exhibitionistic, pseudo-masculine identity, which pursued women and used them in a narcissistic way in an attempt to demonstrate his masculinity. As Anna Freud (26) has pointed out, certain neurotic men behave as if they wished admiration for the phallus and act toward others in such a way as to attempt to extort this admiration. The exaggerated character of this reaction is related to a real fear of being depreciated, inadequate, weak individual, and thus these men behave like a little boy imagines the grown man to be, rather than as a mature man who is secure in his own identity and masculinity actually behaves.

Aretino was fascinated with power and strove to attain, as well as he might, power over his associates and to associate himself with powerful men whom he unsuccessfully tried to emulate. It was clear that there existed childish identification with "externals" rather than a truly adult identification. Aretino tried to act the role of the generous, heroic, nobleman who lived in magnificent luxury and demonstrated his potency by his numerous conquests.

Still another identity would appear to have resulted from an identification with the depreciated, rejecting, castrated mother as seen by the little boy in the phallic era of his development. This was the bitchy, seductive, needling, homosexual, provocative identity so prominent in Aretino's life, which caused him to seduce and court powerful men in a fawning way, and then to inconsistently and capriciously reject them. This first or "negative" identity appears to be that of a little boy in the phallic phase, who continually seeks out powerful and important men and who alternately ex-

torts gifts from them and attacks them, or who at times behaves like a helpful assistant to them, because of his actual fear of being overwhelmed, attacked and castrated by them. A projection of his unconscious wish for anal attack is probably responsible for the paranoid tinge of much of Aretino's writing and to his relationships in his life. He appeared to have repeatedly shifted from one to another of these identities.

Towards the end of his life Aretino showed symptoms of deterioration. His relationships with women became even more slipshod and tawdry. He became more disappointed with his friends and raged more at the injustice of powerful people. Over and over again he followed the pattern of casting off something which had once been precious to him as though it were waste material, whether it be a former mistress, a friendship with one of his secretaries or a literary man; this constituting an anal trait.

Aretino's aggressive impulses, which were so poorly handled by him during his lifetime, can be considered to have been only partially sublimated through his literary work. It seems probable that they were largely and strongly directed toward internal objects and their external, narcissistic representatives. The relation of this fact to his artistic talent and literary production may have been an important one. Freud (16) in his work on Dostoevsky expressed the opinion that this author's literary productiveness had to do with his unconscious parricidal impulses. It is to be noted that Aretino denied for much of his life the existence of his own father, thus in effect killing him in fantasy and substituting for him a nobleman—certainly evidence of a parricidal wish of great intensity. Aretino's acting out was probably related to his lifelong endeavor to ward off depressive feelings, due to his inability to sublimate his aggression of anal and oral origin, which was as a result turned inward upon his own ego introjects and seemed to isolate them from each other.

Aretino's disturbance would appear to have been in the nature of a character deformation with marked narcissistic

oral, and anal sadistic features. A survey of his life and works brings to mind the character of Sir John Falstaff, the fat, charming, cowardly boaster of Shakespeare's "Henry IV" and "The Merry Wives of Windsor." Like Falstaff, Aretino was fat, loquacious, a notorious boaster, drinker, and gourmet. He was witty, charming, but withal cowardly, and he pursued women whom he used for his pleasure, since he was incapable of marriage. He was addicted to madcap adventures, drinking, the pursuit of gain by disreputable means and was chronically in trouble with the authorities. His relationships with the Medici prince Giovanni delle Bande Nere appear like the relationships of Falstaff to both Prince Hal and Hotspur combined. It is not impossible that Shakespeare might have been influenced by the then well-known works and life of Aretino, since Venetian Italian influence was strong in Elizabethan England.

The works of the Renaissance satirists Aretino and Rabelais both show marked evidence of regressive pregenital tendencies which are also evident in their biographies. As one surveys the works of satirists of succeeding centuries, namely Cervantes, Swift, Carroll, Gogol, Shaw and Schnitzler, one encounters evidence of progressively greater ego control of regressive tendencies by the artist. Whether this can be solely attributed to an increasing complexity of ego structure of the people of more recent periods or to a lesser necessity for revolt against tyranny, and a recent attainment of a greater permissiveness and freedom in the social structure is an open question; the influences are not mutually exclusive.

COMMENT

In satire a witty attack is made upon some individual or social institution alleged to be corrupt and held up to public ridicule and disdain. The attack is couched in more or less disguised and elaborated literary expression of oedipal fantasies with more or less pregenital coloring. The satirist poses as an individual interested in the correction of abuses and

in social betterment. The studies of Freud (15) on wit and of Kris (29) on caricature elucidate the mechanisms involved.

The powerful person who is guilty of abuse is the father. Freud's (15) formulations involve a situation in which three persons are engaged. The narrator, the first person, tries to accomplish his instinctual aims toward the second person by magical words or gestures, and preoedipal material is regressively drawn upon for this purpose. The second person is pictures as hostile or rejecting. The instinctual aims of the narrator are suppressed at the instance of a third person toward whom witty overtures are made to gain his support against the second; this third person being the super-ego and the purpose of the wit being to weaken the criticisms emanating therefrom. The primal scene is the main content and it is the son as the first person who makes sexual advances to the mother and who tries to gain the approval of the father by either impersonating the father himself or by pretending to be harmless, and thus impotent, and rejected by the mother. This latter device is often accompanied by homosexual overtures to the father, thus bringing in negative oedipal trends. There is a further endeavor to supplant the father, who was originally the actor in the primal scene, while the son was a spectator, the father now being forced into the role of the passive audience while the son takes the role of the actor. Aretino repeatedly endeavored, in his life as well as in his literary works, to reproduce his early family situation in disguised ways, without ever achieving a harmonious solution or a mastery of his problems.

The reaction of others to this graphic portrayal of infantile fantasy given by the satirist is instructive. There appears to exist an enormous attraction to the satirist as a person who can allow himself the liberty denied to most by their defenses. This attraction is an ambivalent and unstable one, however, since the satirist is liable to sudden attack and may be in danger of his life due to the mobilization of anxiety and unconscious guilt and needs for punishment in the audience all of which become projected on the satirist as a scapegoat. A deep vein of bitterness seems to

exist in most satirists descried psychoanalytically. This seems to have its origin in a feeling of abandonment by the mother and to be a product of the schizoid tendencies of the satirist himself, probably originating in similar traits in the mother, making her appear cold and rejecting to the child.

The life of Aretino appears to consist of little beside the acting out of unconscious impulses. Bird has noted in his study of the genesis of acting out that in cases of neuroses characterized by chronic acting out, the mother, because of structural defect in her own personality, has not allowed the ego of the child to become an independently operating agent. The mother's ego continues to act for the child and to maintain direct contact with his id or his id-representative, and his ego is directly influenced by her id-representative. Thus, he permanently remains in a state in which his ego is susceptible to stimulation by the id of the mother, and as he grows older, he retains his unconscious methods of communication with others, being influenced by them and influencing everyone as if they were his mother. He is uncannily sensitive of the id impulses of others and his ego remains exceptionally sensitive to them so that he reacts to the id impulses of others as if they were his own.

Fenichel (29) and Greenson (30) have emphasized the role of habitual acting out as a defense against a depression. Aretino in his life and works gives evidence of his struggle against deep self-destructive urges and depressive feelings, and we may gauge the strength of his depressive tendencies by the all pervading character of his acting out behavior.

436 North Roxbury Building
Beverly Hills, California

1. Garnett, Richard, "Satire", *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. 20, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1948.
2. Green Peter, "Roman Satire and Roman Society," *History Today*, Vol. III, Nos. 2 and 4, February and April, 1957.
3. Kanzer, Marc, "Gogol", A Treatise on Wit and Paranoia, *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Society*, Vol. III, No. 1, Jan. 1955, pp. 110-121.

4. Trilling, Linel, *The Liberal Imagination*, The Viking Press, New York, 1953.
5. Erikson, Erik H., *Childhood and Society*, London, Imago Publishing Co., 1951.
6. Kupper, Herbert I. and Rollman-Branch, Hilda S., "Freud and Schnitzler (Doppelgänger)" *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Society*, Vol. VII, No. 1, January, 1959.
7. Greenacre, Phyllis, Swift and Carroll, A Psychoanalytic Study
7. Greenacre, Phyllis, Swift and Carroll, *A Psychoanalytic Study of Two Lives*, International University Press, New York, 1955.
8. Sterba, Richard and Sterba, Editha, "The Anxieties of Michelangelo Buonarroti", *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. XXXVI, Part IV-V, July-October, 1956.
9. Sterba, Richard and Sterba, Editha, "Beethoven and His Nephew", Pantheon, New York, 1954.
10. Erikson, Erik M., "Young Man Luther", A Study in Psychoanalysis and History, W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., New York, 1958.
11. Fenichel, Otto, "On Acting", The Collected Papers of Otto Fenichel, Second Series, New York, W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1954.
12. Reich, Annie, The Structure of the Grotesque - Comic Sublimation, *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic* 12. 160-171, 1940.
13. Brenman, M., "On Teasing and Being Teased", The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 7; 264-255, International University Press, 1952.
14. Skinner, J., Lewis Carroll's *Adventure In Wonderland*, American Imago, 4 1-32, 1949.
15. Freud, Sigmund, Wit and the Relation to the Unconscious, in The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, New York Modern Library, 1938.
16. Freud, Sigmund, "Dostoevsky and Parricide", in Collected Papers, Vol. V, Hogarth Press, London, 1950.
17. *Thucydides*, Harvard University Press, 1942.
18. Sachs, Hanns, The Delay of the Machine Age (Tr. by M. J. Powers), *Psyanalytic Quarterly*, 1933, 2; 404-424.
19. Aretino, Pietro, *The Works of Aretino*, Chicago: Covici, 1926.
20. Fresco, Ullisse, *Le Commedie di Pietro Aretino, Camarino*. Typographia Sabini 1901.
21. Aretino, Pietro, *Libro delle Lettre*, Parigi, Matteo il Maestro, 1609, 6 Volumes.
22. Aretino, Pietro, *Raggionamenti delle Corte*, London, 1914.
23. Hutton, Edward, *Pietro Arentino*, Boston, Houghton Publishing Co., 1922.

24. Freud, Sigmund, Contributions to the Psychology of Love, A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men, (1910), Collected Papers, Hogarth Press, London, 1946.
25. Freud, Sigmund, Contribution to the Psychology of Love, The Most Prominent Form of Degradation in Erotic Life (1912), Hogarth Press, London, 1946.
26. Freud, Anna, "Studies in Passivity," lecture delivered at School of Medicine, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, October 25, 1952.
27. Kris, E., *The Psychology of Caricature in Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art*, International Universities Press, New York, 1951.
28. Bird, Brian, A Specific Peculiarity of Acting Out, *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, Volume V, Number 4, October, 1957.
29. Fenichel, Otto, *Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis*, W. W. Norton, New York, 1945.
30. Greenson, Ralph R., "On Screen Defenses, Screen Hunger, and Screen Identity," *Journal of Psychoanalytic Association*, Vol. VI, No. 2, April, 1958.

Freud and the Moses of Michaelangelo

by

Myron L. Wolbarsht

and

Joseph D. Lichtenberg

Throughout his adult life Sigmund Freud continually returned to one theme - that of the story of Moses. He considered not only the historical Moses, but also how the myths about Moses expressed the psychological truth in religion. These were the subjects of his last book, *Moses and Monotheism*. (13) His earliest work on Moses, the essay *The Moses of Michaelangelo*, limited itself to the interpretation of the time in Moses' life represented by Michaelangelo's statue. (2)

The Moses statue was planned as a part of the tomb of Pope Julius II. The tomb was to have had five other statues, each representing an important historical figure. Since the tomb was never finished we do not know exactly how the statue of Moses would have fitted into the whole. However, the statue of Moses is itself quite imposing. Freud says that no piece of statuary made a stronger impression upon him than this one. (2) Ernest Jones suggests that at various times Moses represented a Father-Image to Freud and it seems likely that at other times Freud identified himself with Moses. (4) There is no doubt, Jones goes on to say, that this particular essay is of special interest to students of Freud's personality.

The present paper is an attempt to add to our understanding of one facet of Freud's complex personality - his artistic intuition. Freud's essay *The Moses of Michaelangelo* is well suited to help with this difficult task because:

(1) It contains a clear statement of his emotional response to the statue itself.

(2) It contains a clear statement of his intellectual efforts to solve the problem of interpretation presented by the statue. Since Freud speculated about this statue for almost 15 years (4), his interpretation of it is certainly an important example of the operation of his intuition.

"The statue of Moses," said Freud, "presents an inscrutable aspect to the world." (2) Although many art critics had deemed the problem of the correct interpretation of this statue worthy of their attention, Freud found that no real agreement has been realized among them. In spite of the many divergent opinions that Freud reviewed, he concluded that none of them offered a satisfactory explanation. As we shall see later, Freud was correct when he was led by his artistic sensibilities to reject their theories.

Let us examine the statue and Freud's intellectual and intuitive reactions to it. For our purposes it will suffice to begin by quoting Freud's own description of the statue. "The Moses of Michaelangelo is represented as seated; his body faces forward, his head with its mighty beard looks to the left, his right foot rests on the ground and his left leg is raised so that only the toes touch the ground. His right arm links the Tables of the Law with a portion of his beard; his left arm lies in his lap." Freud also mentions Max Sauerlandt's description of this statue as the Moses with the head of Pan - evidently referring to the arrangement of Moses' hair to form two horns on his head. We shall say more regarding these horns later; they offer a key to the interpretation of the statue.

Freud cited some critics who believed that the statue represents a timeless study of mood and character. Freud and many of the other critics disagreed with this view and felt that this is a portrayal of Moses at a particular and highly significant moment of his life. That moment, in Freud's words, " is the descent from Mt. Sinai where Moses received the Tables from God and it is the moment when he perceives that the people have meanwhile made themselves a Golden Calf and are dancing around it and rejoicing. This is the scene upon which his eyes are turned."

Freud considered that "Michaelangelo has chosen this last moment of calm before the storm for his representation. In the next instant Moses will spring to his feet - his left foot is already raised from the ground - hurl the Tables to the ground, and let loose his rage upon his faithless people." This is, of course, the scene described in Exodus XXXIII: 7-35.

By a minute examination of the details of the statue - the placement of the hand, the Tablets, the beard, etc. - Freud showed that Moses was not immediately about to begin a violent action. He suggested that Moses had just had a violent fit of rage and is now restraining himself. Freud was not entirely satisfied with this interpretation and felt that other details did not fit. For example, "it should be remarked that the careful arrangement of the mantle over the knees of the seated figure would lead us to suppose that Moses is represented as sitting there in calm repose."

Now let us turn to Freud's description of his own reaction to the statue. "I can recollect my own disillusionment when, during my first visits to the church (St. Pietro in Vincole), I used to sit down in front of the statue in the expectation that I would now see how it would start up on its raised foot, hurl the Tablets of the Law to the ground and let fly its wrath. Nothing of the kind happened. Instead, the stone image became more and more transfixed, an almost oppressively solemn calm emanated from it, and I was obliged to realize that something was represented here that could stay without change; that this Moses would remain sitting like this in his wrath forever."

Thus, Freud is left with the feeling of an oppressive, solemn calm emanating from the statue. This we feel is what Michaelangelo was trying to present with this statue and the horns are the detail that tells us this.

Moses is described with the Tablets of the Law in two separate passages in the Bible. The first, Exodus XXXIII: 7-35, is the one that we have mentioned earlier. This is the one that Freud quotes, in which Moses descends from Mt. Sinai, sees the Israelites dancing about the Golden Calf, becomes angry and breaks the Tables. In a sense he does

not really give the people the law here because they are not yet worthy of it. The other passage where Moses is described carrying the Tablets is Exodus XXXIV: 29-35. Here Moses is described at what may be the most sublime time of his life. He has again been up on Mt. Sinai, this time for forty days and forty nights without food and drink. He has again received the Tablets of the Law from God and, most important of all, he has actually looked upon God. Not upon his face - for no man may do that and live - but upon his hind parts, and he now comes down from Mt. Sinai bearing the Tablets and reflecting the Divine Glory. This passage in the Bible is as follows (1):

“29. And it came to pass, when Moses came down from Mount Sinai with the two tables of testimony in Moses hand, when he came down from the mount, that Moses wist not that the skin on his face shone while he talked with him.

30. And when Aaron and all the children of Israel saw Moses, behold, the skin on his face shone; and they were afraid to come nigh him.

31. And Moses called unto them; and Aaron and all the rulers of the congregation returned unto him: and Moses talked with them.

32. And afterward all the children of Israel came nigh: and he gave them in commandment all that the LORD had spoken with him in Mount Sinai.

33. And till Moses had done speaking with them, he put a vail on his face.

34. But when Moses went in before the LORD to speak with him, he took the vail off, until he came out. And he came out, and spake unto the children of Israel that he was commanded.

35. And the children of Israel saw the face of Moses, that the skin of Moses face shone: and Moses put the vail upon his face again, until he went in to speak with him.”

The Hebrew word which is translated “shone” is a peculiar one occurring only in this passage as a verb. It is a denominative from *Keren* “horn” in the sense of *ray* (used also in this sense in Hab. III: 40) and means “was rayed.”

St. Jerome rendered the Hebrew literally in the Vulgate - *quod cornatu esset*. (1) A reader of this passage in the Vulgate would imagine a Moses with horns. Since the Vulgate Bible was the only version available to Michaelangelo and the Renaissance artists, it is not surprising that this passage is represented in various works of art with a horned Moses. Freud points out how closely the artists adhered to the Biblical text. To deviate was considered heretical. Thus, an ordinary Moses may mean many things; a horned Moses can only come from this particular passage.

Michaelangelo in his horned Moses could not be trying to show an angry Moses - a Moses who is about to rise and break the Tables. He has presented a powerful, sublime Moses who will never move. Moses has given the Divine Law to his people and his work is done. There is no Golden Calf in the background, no rebellious people; there is before Moses only a submissive, frightened people who see on Moses the awful reflection of God.

We can see from this an example of the acuteness of Freud's artistic intuition. He was intellectually convinced that Moses was struggling with his anger and about to rise and break the Tablets, but this is not what the statue says to him. He saw only the solemn calm emanating from it.

Freud concludes his article thus: "In his creations Michaelangelo has often enough gone to the utmost limit of what is expressible in art; and perhaps in his statue of Moses he has not completely succeeded, if his design was to trace the passage of a violent gust of passion (anger) in the signs left by it on the ensuing calm." Freud thus showed that he felt the spirit of the statue. He was, however, prevented from discovering that the statue represents Moses with the second set of Tablets because he was unaware of the significance of the horns. It would seem that had the proper meaning been presented to Freud he would have found it in agreement with his own prior intuitions.

Myron L. Wolbarsht
The Psychiatric Institute
345 W. Redwood St.
Baltimore 1, Maryland

Joseph D. Lichtenberg
The Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital
Baltimore

REFERENCES

1. THE BIBLE, Old Testament. The book of Exodus, Rev. ed. With introduction and notes by S. R. Driver. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Pr. 1911.
2. FREUD, S.: The Moses of Michaelangelo, (1914). Standard edition, xiv, p. 211.
3. FREUD, S.: Moses and monotheism (1939). Standard edition, xxiii.
4. JONES, E.: The Life and work of Sigmund Freud, II New York, Basic Books, Inc. 1955.

An Interpretation of the Mind-Body Problem

By

Ernest H. Hutten.

Epistemological dualism is the view that man consists of two, completely separate and essentially different entities - mind and body - and that all human behaviour must be explained by the causal action between these entities**. This model of man, that there exists a total split in his personality, is obviously the product of an ambivalent fantasy. No wonder, then, that the mind-body problem cannot be solved either by logical or by factual argument, that it has been a puzzle mystifying philosophers for some two thousand years. For fantasies are not overcome by logic, not even by facts - though both logical reasoning and factual knowledge help us in defeating a fantasy by confronting us with reality.

I want to illustrate the situation by discussing, briefly, the official, philosophical attempts at treating the mind-body problem. In particular, I want to look at the notions of *substance* and of *cause* which are crucial here. Both these notions are typical of metaphysics; they exemplify the kind of intellectual defence that philosophers are prone to indulge in. The excessive use of *dichotomies* that characterizes this mode of philosophizing supports my view that we deal here

*Paper read to the Imago Group (London) on June 16, 1960

**In an earlier essay on "The Mind-Body Problem", published in *Methodos*, vol. 5 (1953), pp. 187-202, I discussed the three main types of epistemological theory, i.e. interactionism, epiphenomenalism and parallelism and arrived at the conclusion that they lead to a paradoxical causality. In the second article, "What is the Mind-Body Problem?" (*The Rationalist Annual* (1960), pp. 42-50, I discussed what the mind-body problem means in western philosophy by relating it to its origin in Greek thought.

with an empty defence, in the service of the pleasure-principle rather than of the reality-principle.

Mind, after all, is the abstract name by which we call our perceptions and feelings or, rather, the intellectual elaborations of them which are our concepts. Mind is part of, or a development of, the psyche: in short, mind represents the inner world. How could we ever consider this as a single lump of something, a substance - however ethereal and tenuous? And, again, by 'body' in this connexion we do not mean to refer to chairs and tables, we mean our own, human body - something alive, and not dead like a piece of wood. How could we ever come to identify our own bodies, when alive, with something dead and so introduce physics and 'inanimate' mechanisms of action into the picture of man?

Man's picture of himself - our model of man - indicates the degree of maturity we have reached. The body-schema, for example, but equally the ego-ideal or the ego-imago - they all reflect in some ways, in an intellectual mirror, what we feel ourselves to be.

Whatever we can see with our eyes, we count as belonging to the external world, and so our bodies are 'outside' of us, except the head. We cannot see our heads directly, only by an artificial device like a mirror; and thus the head, or what it represents, belongs to the inner world. We are ourselves *part visible, part invisible*: this is the picture we have of ourselves. For we can look at our limbs, not at our feelings and emotions hidden in our heads. Thus we must invent two realms that are essentially different (though not necessarily disconnected) - mind and body - otherwise we fail to recognize the picture as one of ourselves. This is no doubt the origin of the two-substance theories of man. And according to whether we feel the inner or the outer world, mind or body, to be good or bad, as providing us with control or as lacking control, etc. we invent the various epistemological theories. If our fantasies are pleasant, we become idealists, and make matter an excrescence of mind. And, vice versa, if we take the external world as benign, or at least as more reliable than the inner world, then

we make matter the basis of everything and mind an outgrowth of it. This is epiphenomenalism. Parallelism, then, the idea that mental and physical events never come together but, miraculously, run side by side, perpetuates the split in human personality. Descartes' view was like this, or the two-clocks theory of Geulincx, and the so-called occasionalism; this view soon developed into the two-aspects theory, for example, of Spinoza. This theory represents the two realms of mind and body as simply the two sides of one, underlying though hidden, reality: thus, the split is healed. And interactionism - the idea that mental and physical events act on each other - equally tries to heal the split introduced by the epistemological model of man. It is, in other words, not possible for the philosopher to maintain the split: he must always try to bring the two parts together again. This oscillation between dualism and monism, so to speak, expresses the ambivalent attitude underneath these philosophies.

Epistemological dualism is derived from a fantasy, from the infant's misunderstanding of his earliest experiences, the result of an immature conceptualisation*. Thinking in 'substances' is a 'concrete' mode and a more 'abstract' picture of man is needed if we want to do justice to reality. It is the Ego - which cannot be said to be either mental or physical - that represents the adult, reasonably integrated, human being.

It may be easy to criticize and to dismiss the two-substance theories and the epistemological split supposed to exist in human beings. It is more difficult to make clear what is wrong with causality, with the relation between the two substances, between mind and body.

Here we must remember first, that causality is itself a metaphysical notion; that it was, originally, the relation of punishment to crime as the Greek word for cause, *aitia*, shows. Only slowly did the concept of cause become more refined. We realise, however, that even the most refined concept still carries with it, in a subdued and subterranean

*Schizophrenic patients seem to regard mind as male, body as female.

form, the original meaning it once possessed. While the conscious and intellectual meaning of a concept may be irreproachable, that is, a rational construction designed to fit a real situation, there remains an emotional meaning tied to it due the origin of the concept in an unconscious fantasy. It is obvious that the mind-body problem which arouses so much emotion in us will also bring out strongly the more fantastic side of causality. Or, to say the same thing in another way: it is a fact that philosophers have usually employed the most mechanistic type of causality in their attempts to picture the mind-body relation. They so indulged in a fantasy of omnipotence, the greatest omnipotence they could imagine; thus they denied the anxiety aroused in them by the mind-body problem.

Mechanistic causality - a unique and single cause producing a unique, single effect with unfailing necessity - has no meaning any longer even in physics whence it arose. (In academic psychology, it still plays a role, even today). Still, I do not want to say more about this here, save to point out that statistical correlation has taken the place of mechanistic causality in physics. Necessity has been banished from the world picture of physics, and there is even no need any more to specify a definite mechanism, or mode of action, in order to explain how a causal sequence of events comes about. A much more 'abstract' conception of cause has evolved, far removed from the original meaning of 'cause' as a blow, as the force of violence. Similarly, in psychology, we have learned to accept aetiology, that is, multiple causation (if we want to express it in traditional terms). Aetiology represents also a loosening of the causal chain, but to a much smaller extent than has occurred in physics. Here, in the mind-body problem, there remains still to answer the question: what kinds of things are cause and effect?

'Mind' and 'Body' are abstract nouns, and we can easily dismiss them as causal agents. "I do not think that the mind really exists as an entity" (Jones). Instead, modern philosophers say that physical events cause mental events, or vice versa. For example, 'Barbiturate causes us to sleep',

or 'Fear makes us sweat'. These are the two extremes: a 'purely physical' agent causing a mental state or 'a purely mental' agent causing a physical state; and there seems to exist a whole spectrum of action and interaction between the physical, or organic, and the mental realm.

But to say that mental events cause physical events, or vice versa, is to assume, implicitly, that there exist disembodied minds. Otherwise it would make no sense to speak of a mental event: if we cannot isolate it, how can we say that it is causing, or is caused by, anything? And similarly we must assume the existence of 'demented' bodies - not merely chairs and tables to which we would certainly not want to ascribe mental qualities - but human bodies that are alive. Obviously, this makes no sense. Thus, philosophers helped themselves by speaking of 'pains' and 'pleasures', etc; or, if they wanted to be more 'technical', they spoke of 'impressions', 'sense data' and the like.

This terminology, far from solving the mind-body problem, raised a hornets' nest of new problems.* Pains, and pleasures, and sense data are, we are told, 'private' and 'subjective'. Only *I* can have *my* toothache. How can we ever make the jump to the 'public' and 'objective' world in which physical bodies are supposed to exist? How can private sense-experience lead to public knowledge? Some modern philosophers have quite solemnly maintained that solipsism is a tenable, even impregnable, position. The so-called 'other minds problem' is seriously discussed. Can we ever know what is going on in someone else's mind - and, therefore, can anyone ever find out what is going on in our own minds? Many philosophers today give the answer, which they consider comforting, that indeed no one can find out what we are feeling. I do not want to discuss here modern empiricism and phenomenalism - the common name for these speculations. The most rational version of these -isms is, in the end, that there are two kinds of language, the sense-

*Thomas S. Szasz, *Pain and Pleasure*, Tavistock Publ. Ltd., London, 1957

data language and the material-object language, for short. Then the question arises, how are these two languages related to one another. Once the problem has been turned into one of language, there is no longer a possibility of relating the mental world to the physical world by causality. Languages are not related to one another by causality. Sense-data cause other sense-data, or physical things are in causal relation with other physical things. Thus, the two-languages theory is a successor to the two aspects theory and of psycho-physical parallelism. It has the merit of avoiding a spurious causality, but the theory all the same remains within the closed circle of epistemological thinking.

Let me mention here that behaviourism and functionalism - two recent, more 'technical' theories about the mind-body relation - essentially remain within the epistemological circle. Behaviourism, briefly, is the theory which asserts that whatever human beings feel must be inferred from what they do. This is a truism, if taken in the general sense, namely, that observation is, in the last resort, the only basis for knowledge (including self-observation). When taken in a stricter sense, the theory is false. There is no one-one correlation between feelings and actions; most of our inner life does not lead to immediately observable consequences. Moreover, language - often the only means of expressing our feelings - has to be taken as part of the physical behaviour; but words then are merely sounds and noises, unless we know what they refer to, what they signify. The basic problem so remains. Since we can lie with our deeds as well as with our words, how can we relate our behaviour, a physical process, to our mental processes? The same observable behaviour may mean many different things in our inner world. Behaviourism, then, is at best a programme: it requires other theories to make it workable.

Functionalism, briefly, is the theory that claims that mind and body are related to one another as the function to the organ to which it belongs. We sometimes speak of neurosis as a functional disturbance. (Köhler's idea of isomorphism is very close to this, namely, that mind accom-

panies brain processes as the magnetic field surrounds the electric current in a wire, or nerve - a sort of immaterial halo). This view, too, does not stand up to criticism. We cannot really separate the organ and its function, though we may be able to distinguish healthy from unhealthy functioning sometimes. A function does not exist apart from the body (as little as a relation exists apart from the things that satisfy the relation). The same disfunction, however, may mean, or refer to, a vast variety of affects. We have always overdetermination. Thus, like behaviourism, functionalism is only a kind of well-meaning programme: it requires other theories to give it content and so make it testable and scientifically acceptable. Any pronouncement of what mind and body 'really' are, in terms of entities or whatever else - any kind of *ontology* - is useless.

It is usual to say 'I have a pain in my finger because I pricked it with a pin'; or 'Anger always makes my face go red'; etc. In everyday life we do relate isolated sensations and emotions to isolated physical happenings. But there are no isolated pains, existing by themselves, independent of human beings. Equally, there exist no pinpricks in splendid isolation. This is true only in the weird world of Lewis Carroll.

A pinprick may initiate a certain physical, or physiological, process but what I feel is not uniquely determined by it; sometimes I may not even feel it at all. The physical process alone does not explain the sensation. Different nervous processes may correspond to the same sensation, and so on. The model of causal action that is appropriate here is not that of physics. The pin piercing my skin does not act in the same manner as one billiard ball hitting another one. When I prick my finger, it is a person, an Ego, that is involved. I feel pain, because my ego feels threatened: it fears the intrusion of an external object, or the loss of an internal object, or perhaps the loss of a part of the body. And, similarly, I feel pleasure because I regained a real or fantasy object or made good a loss, or something like this. We know, after all, that our affects are modelled on our

earliest experiences with part-objects, transitional objects and, finally, complete objects. The object-relations we have formed in the course of our lives determine the kind and intensity of our feelings. In other words, the causal story always involves a whole person: his life-history must be included and, in particular, the unconscious processes that determine the individual's response to a stimulus. We see here how overdetermination and multiple causation - to use the customary phrases - come into the explanation of human behaviour.

Let me point out here the role time plays in the causal explanation. Usually, the cause precedes the effect, however slight the time-lag may be, since physical action takes time to produce a result. This is only the echo of the crime-punishment relation. But often an external stimulus or cause may trigger off an internal event-sequence in us. The ego reacts to the present cause as it did a long time ago, in infancy. A traumatic episode in infancy may have, originally, given rise to a certain symptom. The same symptom occurs today: but it is no use trying to relate the present stimulus to the symptom in the hope of curing it. Another causal connexion is involved; and there is another temporal sequence of events which, from the viewpoint of today, are simultaneous. The effect, i.e. the symptom, is already in existence before the present stimulus is applied. This appears to us as the temporal coincidence, or synchronicity, of mental phenomena that we sometimes find.

To say, then, that mental events cause physical events, or vice versa, is to cut up a living being into two parts. It is like saying that two parts of a human body may be in a causal relation to one another - as if my eyes cause my legs to move, because I have seen an obstacle in my path. It is the human being that is the causal agent, and any causal explanation must include the life-history of the person.

When we distinguish physical and mental pain, for example, or organic and psychogenic symptoms, etc., we do not mean to invent two different and forever separate modes of existence. It is not two pains we are talking about, nor do

we wish to find a causal relation between them. When I prick my finger with a pin, it is not a mystery why I feel both physical and mental pain. For the finger is *my* finger, and so my whole life-history - my attitude to real and fantasy objects - comes into the causal account. We attend unconsciously either to the inner or to the outer objects; and we can freely shift our attention from one to the other and, indeed, we always attend to both at the same time, though to a different degree. This is how I would paraphrase Freud's statement that 'the transition from physical to mental pain corresponds to a change from narcissistic cathexis to object cathexis'.

There is, however, nothing 'purely mental' nor 'purely physical' in a living human being. Even the most 'organic' symptom has a 'psychogenic' component; and vice versa. We cannot separate the one from the other, for this would mean killing the human being: we cannot invent a causal link between such spurious entities, claiming that one produces the other. A human response to a stimulus always involves both the inner and the external world, and the two are not cut off from one another; they are in a dynamic equilibrium due to the incessant introjection and projection by which we maintain ourselves. To cut mind from body, to invent two such, idealized, entities, and then to try to control their relation by a mechanical causality, is to do no more than overcome our basic ambivalence by splitting. Idealization may be a useful intellectual device, say, in mathematics; but it has always a limit, and it is inapplicable when we try to describe human behaviour. Idealization gives us a wrong picture of man. Thus, neither philosophical dualism nor monism - epistemology, in short - nor any static explanation can be useful; we need a dynamic explanation that includes the tension of ambivalence - polarity - if we want to fit our theories to the facts of life.

52 Compayne Gardens.
London, N.W. 6, England.

A Psychoanalytic Reading of Hawthorne's "Major Molineux"

The Father Manque and the Protégé Manque

by

Louis Paul, M.D.

I

Three critics, Simon O. Lesser, (1) Franklin B. Newman, (2) and Hyatt H. Waggoner, (3) have recently ventured psychoanalytic interpretations of one of Hawthorne's finest stories, one perhaps "indeed among the greatest stories in the language," (4) "My Kinsman, Major Molineux." I wish to extend these interpretations to more of the text and correct some points and emphases I think are erroneous. My main criticisms are adumbrated by two proposed emendations to a summary statement by Lesser:

"The tendencies which assert themselves in Robin exist in all men. What he is doing, unwittingly but flamboyantly, is something which every young man does and must do, however gradually, prudently and inconspicuously: he is destroying an image of paternal authority so that, freed from its restraining influence, he can begin life as an adult." (5)

I would emend this to read: "... something which every *neurotic* young man does ... *not* destroying *but unconsciously preserving* an image of paternal authority ... " Recall that Robin himself does not "destroy" any paternal image. The humiliation of Major Molineux is accomplished by the townspeople who not only destroy an *image* of authority but desecrate by mockery and ignominy an actual authority, a public official. (6) By contagion Robin is caught up

in the crowd's scornful laughter, and laughs the loudest of all at the "tar-and-feathery dignity" of the degraded officer. He thereby becomes a party to the public derogation and deposing of his kinsman, yet without an awareness of the inner sources of his jeering laughter, and with a quick desire to return to his home in the country that very night. Only the intervention of a friendly townsman, "a gentleman in his prime, of open, intelligent, cheerful, and altogether prepossessing countenance," reminds him that "as you are a shrewd youth, you may rise in the world without the help of your kinsman, Major Molineux."

The weight of this epilogue is on the side of a neurotic resolution of Robin's unconscious conflicts, even though the advice of the kind stranger is on the side of health. For here we see that Robin has relied on and is advised by a father-substitute; his unconscious longing for submission to an idealized father still persists.

The themes which make this such a powerful story can be organized around three kinds of relationships. Following the terminology of Henry Ezriel, the three kinds of object relations are: "first, one which the patient [protagonist] tries to establish with the analyst [the object—the authority-figure] and which I call the *required* relationship, since he requires it in order to avoid the second, which I accordingly call the *avoided* relationship; this he feels he has to avoid in external reality because he is convinced that if he gave in to his secret desire of entering into it this would inevitably lead to the third relationship, a *calamity*. This conviction could be explained by making the hypothesis that in his unconscious phantasies, his inner world of psychical reality, he does establish the avoided relationship with an unconscious object, with calamitous consequences." (7) (In psychoanalysis an object is usually a person, but may be a thing or idea. In the older terminology, the required relationship is called the defense; the avoided relationship, the unconscious desire; and the calamitous relationship, the feared or self-inflicted punishment for the desire.)

The first and third relationships are overt in the text of

Hawthorne's story and directly involve Robin. The second, or avoided, relationship gradually becomes more and more manifest in the text, mocking laughter being its predominant forerunner, as Waggoner has so well traced it; (8) but this is not Robin's laughter until the climax of the public disgrace of his kinsman at the hands of others, an insurrection he belatedly joins.

The required relationship for Robin is to idealize the father-substitute and submit to his authority as a protégé. The avoided relationship is to abase the Major and render him impotent—in power and authority, and as we shall see, procreatively as well. The calamity is for Robin to incur the selfsame humiliation and impotence of power and sexuality, and he does. He is again and again the butt of mocking laughter, and of curses. He is “so often and so strangely thwarted,” i.e., self-thwarted, in his quest for his kinsman. He does not succeed with—read *succeed to*—the pretty mistress in the scarlet petticoat. His search for the Major verges on failure until a kind gentleman encourages him to wait and not stray from a spot where, after a desperate wandering through the streets, he has been told by a fearsome looking man, who later appears as the leader of the rebellious colonists, that “Major Molineux will pass by.”

Robin has come to pay a visit to a kinsman who is idealized and to whom he will be in tutelage. The Major, “an elderly man, of large and majestic person” with “a head grown gray in honor,” is rich, of “great pomp,” has civil and military rank, and wishes to “establish” the youth “in life.” The rebelliousness of those who submit to imposed authority is set forth in the opening sentences of the story. “The people looked with most jealous scrutiny to the exercise of power which did not emanate from themselves, and they usually rewarded their rulers with slender gratitude for the compliances” extended. Six governors in forty years suffered popular insurrections. Robin is quick to consider taking up his cudgel against those who hamper him.

In the relationship of submission to a father-figure, there is the expectation of ultimately succeeding to the father's

position, and to the father's "women." During the period of apprenticeship women are relinquished "voluntarily" and are seen by projection as sexual temptresses. This is so with Robin, whom the mistress in the scarlet petticoat three times unsuccessfully tempts. This "pretty mistress"—"her face was oval and pretty, her hair dark beneath the little cap, and her bright eyes possessed a sly freedom, which triumphed over those of Robin"—is a precursive avatar of Hawthorne's dark lady of Salem. (9)

There is significance in the name of the protagonist, a diminutive of Robert, meaning fame, glory, bright; literally, bright in fame. Robin is an ambitious young man. He likes to remind himself of his "shrewdness," a warning to us that his obeisance may be deceptive—and self-deceptive.

II

The scene after Robin debarks from the ferry, "with as eager an eye as if he were entering London city," manifests the three relationships in typical ways. Robin "hastened his steps to overtake" a figure "moderately in advance" of him. This is an elderly gentleman with full wig and a long, polished cane struck down at every step. Robin takes hold of the skirt of the old man's coat, and making a low bow, respectfully addresses him in a very loud voice. He is rebuked "in a tone of excessive anger and annoyance": "Let go my garment, fellow! . . . I have authority, I have—hem, hem—authority; and if this be the respect you show for your betters, your feet shall be brought acquainted with the stocks by daylight, tomorrow morning!"

Two barbers, in front of whose shop this encounter takes place, pursue Robin with "an ill-mannered roar of laughter" as he hastens away. Robin thinks the old man "is some country representative who . . . lacks the breeding to answer a stranger civilly." He is "tempted to turn back and smite him on the nose."

Here we see Robin impetuously making obeisance with a bow accentuated by an importunate and subservient hold on the old man's coat, and declaring respect ("honored

sir'') in an ill-mannered loudness of voice; respectful submission is gauchely mingled with inchoate incivility. The old man proclaims his possession of authority, his long cane a symbol of power, and threatens a punishment of public humiliation and humbling restraint.

The avoided relationship becomes more apparent when Robin entertains the impulse to strike the old man on the nose; the nose, in the psychology of the emotions, may represent phallic power. Robin attributes incivility and gaucherie to the other, thus veiling his own inner rebellion by a projection. The calamity comes when he is rudely laughed at and soon ineffectually becomes entangled in a maze of dark and empty waterfront streets. The impotence and ridicule he wishes for the father-surrogate descends on him.

Scrutiny of subsequent scenes would yield similar findings. The ineptness of Robin's attempt to find his influential kinsman, a perceptive observation made by Lesser, needs to be brought in line with the three kinds of relations because the vacillation is a strong undercurrent in Robin's behavior, unacknowledged by him although he does recognize that his search "had been so often and so strangely thwarted." Robin's irresoluteness extends even to withdrawal by almost falling asleep. It is comprehensible, however, when we recognize that to not come upon the Major would obviate the three relationships, all seriously distasteful or disabling or tempting in one way or another, and all fraught with distress.

To not rely on the Major and submit to his or any other's tutelage would require one of two other courses of action: to strike out on one's own in the city, or remain at home under father's aegis. The latter course of retreat is Robin's desire, and it is countered by the proposal of the first alternative by his counselor in the closing scene. Robin's response to this advice is not given, but in his last words he twice informs us of his predilection for a guide "in life": "I begin to grow weary of a town life, sir. Will you show me the way to the ferry?"

There is perhaps yet another reason for Robin's avoidance of his kinsman. The attachment to him would not be shared

with a wife, and a danger might be felt in this too exclusive possession of a man. And again, while no children would threaten to intrude on the singular tie, there might be the advent of still other protégés.

III

When our inquiry turns to the deeper sources of the conflicts confined in the three relationships, we no longer expect the text to be explicit. We look now for hints and intimations, and realize once more the rich ambiguity of belles lettres and the over-determination or multiple function of any behavior, i.e., any action discharges impulses from several sources simultaneously. Our conclusions derive less confirmation from the text.

A conspicuous fact about the object of idealization in this tale is his childlessness, and apparent wifelessness. Major Molineux is a father *manqué*, an authority *manqué*. (10) This suggests that antagonism and awe of the procreative function, shielding the desire that no more children arrive, lie beneath Robin's deceptive obeisance. Why should a childless, wifeless man, one not a father although in a fatherly position to a populace, be chosen for idealization? Because he is already disesteemed for procreative impotence, and hence less an object of rivalry and destructive envy in that quarter. Being wifeless, he is not a candidate for cuckolding. Cuckholding of the father, and emotional estrangement or detachment, i.e., wifelessness and childlessness, are central themes in Hawthorne. In "Major Molineux" direct confrontation of the procreative issue is skirted.

The imagery of Robin's "heavy cudgel formed of an oak sapling, and retaining a part of the hardened root" emphasizes the youthfulness of his phallic equipment, and its attachment to infancy, in contrast to the old man's "long and polished cane" and the watchman's "long staff, spiked at the end." On the main street "silver-hilted swords glided past him and dazzled his optics." The red-and-black doubled-faced leader of the insurrection is on horseback, bearing a drawn sword. The leader's forehead bulging on each side

with a vale between, the "broad hooked" nose coming "boldly forth," is an awesome phallic symbol.

" . . . the leader, by his fierce and variegated countenance, appeared like war personified; the red of one cheek was an emblem of fire and sword; the blackness of the other betokened the mourning that attends them." The war on authority is penalized by death, and is a war to the death. Freud has noted that nothing but physical death finally satisfies the condition of complete emancipation. The hero's uncomfortable thought before the advent of the procession that his kinsman might be dead and come to nod to him as a ghost, the several references to "a thought of the cold grave obtruding among wrathful passions," to red and black, fire and darkness, and the crossing over on the ferry as an allusion to entering the realm of death, converge on this interpretation.

IV

Considering the solutions proposed in the story, we see that each of the three kinds of object relationships is maladaptive and immature. The required relationship restrains and binds one's powers. The avoided relationship constantly tempts violence. The calamitous relationship inflicts on oneself the treatment intended for the other. The healthy solution is to relinquish the required relationship, "you may rise in the world without the help of your kinsman", become reconciled to the father's rightful claims to procreation, power and authority, and renounce the goal of depreciating him beyond his desert.

Freud says: "From the time of puberty onward the human individual must devote himself to the great task of *freeing himself from the parents*; and only after this detachment is accomplished can he cease to be a child and so become a member of the social community. For a son, the task consists in releasing his libidinal desires from his mother, in order to employ them in the quest of an external love-object in reality; and in reconciling himself with his father if he has remained antagonistic to him, or in freeing himself

from his domination if, in the reaction to the infantile revolt, he has lapsed into subservience to him. These tasks are laid down for every man . . . In neurotics, however, this detachment from the parents is not accomplished at all; the son remains all his life in subjection to his father, and incapable of transferring his libido to a new sexual object." (11)

The outcome in Hawthorne's story is that Robin abandons Major Molineux after involuntarily laughing at him, substitutes the kind gentleman as a guide, and is about to retreat homeward to resume the attachment to mother and the bondage to father. The avoided relationship is not resolved or brought into awareness, it is postponed. The healthy son integrates selected standards or restraints proposed by the father, as inner constraints, and becomes his own man. The Joseph story recounts a mature resolution of the same conflicts. Phoebe Pyncheon, in *The House of the Seven Gables*, who also has come from the country to the home of a kinsman, "impelled . . . forth, as might be said, to seek her fortune, but with a self-respecting purpose to confer as much benefit as she could anyway receive," quickly proves to be the guide, helpmate, and invigorator of her hostess, Hepzibah Pyncheon, and her broken-spirited, feckless brother, Clifford, a testament of Phoebe's adult powers.

My reading of the story leads to a rejection of Waggoner's sanguine conclusion: "Passing through the stages of initial identification with the father image, rejection, and shame, Robin emerges at last with the help of the stranger into maturity." (12) My interpretation is closer to Newman's: "The search itself is wrong, not just its object. . . . Robin in his search for special privilege has erred, but his error does not seem irretrievable." Then: "He is young, strong, and capable of the self-reliance that the situation demands of him." (13) Young? Yes, even callow. Strong? Self-reliant? Regretfully, no.

Mrs. Leavis writes: "Hawthorne never anywhere surpassed this tale (written when he was not more than twenty-seven) in dramatic power, in control of tone, pace, and ten-

sion, and in something more wonderful, the creation of a suspension between the fullest consciousness of meaning and the emotional incoherence of dreaming." (14) We feel the stirring impact of this mythic master story in the "tremendous ridicule" of the spectacle of his honored kinsman "reviled by that great multitude" in a ritual totem drama—as Robin did, for are we not blood brothers?

161 South Doheny Drive
Beverly Hills, California

1. Simon O. Lesser, "The Image of the Father: A Reading of 'My Kinsman, Major Molineux' and 'I Want to Know Why,'" *Partisan Review*, XXII (Summer 1955), 372-390; reprinted in his *Fiction and the Unconscious* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), ch. IX.
2. Franklin B. Newman, "'My Kinsman, Major Molineux': An Interpretation," *The University of Kansas City Review*, XXI (March 1955), 203-212.
3. Hyatt H. Waggoner, *Hawthorne: A Critical Study* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 46-53. (My critique also applies to an essay which came to my attention when my article was in press: Seymour L. Gross, "Hawthorne's 'My Kinsman, Major Molineux': History as Moral Adventure," *Nineteenth Century Fiction*, XII [1957], 97-109.)
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.
5. Lesser, p. 381.
6. An earlier portent of rebellion is celebrated by Hawthorne in "Endicott and the Red Cross." The King's banner is thrust through with a sword and the royal cross torn off—"in honor of the ensign of New England." Here an image of authority is defaced.
7. Henry Ezriel, "Experimentation within the Psycho-Analytic Session," *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, VII (May 1956), 29-48. Similar material is in his "Notes on Psychoanalytic Group Therapy: II Interpretation and Research," *Psychiatry*, XV (May 1952), 119-126.
8. Waggoner, pp. 47-50. "Young Goodman Brown," written in the same period as "Major Molineux," also echoes with terrible mocking laughter. The gloom of discovering the evil, i.e., rebelliousness, in all hearts leads Goodman Brown thereafter to emotionally isolate himself from his wife of three months and

his neighbors. He has lost his faith in human nature as virtuous. Once again it is the theme of hidden rebelliousness forever handicapping a man and inducing estrangement from his fellows. Perhaps it is not so strange that Puritan piety so often wins out in Hawthorne's narratives.

9. See Philip Rahv, "The Dark Lady of Salem," in his *Image and Idea: Twenty Essays on Literary Themes*, rev. ed. (Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions Paperbook, 1957), pp. 27-50; reprinted from *Partisan Review*, VIII (Sept.-Oct. 1941).
10. On the political level, this is a criticism of the British rule as defective in humaneness. Mrs. Leavis has very penetratingly annotated this theme in Hawthorne. See Q. D. Leavis, "Hawthorne as Poet," *The Sewanee Review*, LIX (Spring, Summer 1951), 179-205, 426-458.
11. Sigmund Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis* (Garden City, N. Y.: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1943), p. 295.
12. Waggoner, p. 52.
13. Newman, p. 210.
14. Leavis (above, note 10), p. 200.

On Sigmund Freud's Personality

by

Dr. Richard Sterba

I felt greatly honored when I was invited to talk to you on the occasion of your Freud Centenary and I gladly accepted the invitation, though not without some apprehension. I decided to talk to you not about Freud's works. Their overwhelming significance for the understanding and further development of the human mind can easily be recognized by anybody who observes the penetration of psychoanalytic thinking into practically every field of modern human endeavour as in education, medicine, sociology, anthropology, biology, ethnology, folkloristics, the world of literary creation and even into economics and industry. So I chose as my topic Freud's personality. But I certainly feel neither equipped nor does my time permit me to make a presentation of Freud's total personality. Therefore I would like to talk to you about some particular features in Freud's character which do not express themselves so clearly in his scientific writings. But even with such limitation I have to realize the heavy responsibility this subject puts on the person who undertakes such a task with serious intentions.

Does not Freud's work speak for itself, is not this itself. Does not Freud's work speak for itself, is not this the important and essential part of his existence? Why talk about the rest? Freud himself certainly considered his work the essence of his personality. When he was asked to write his autobiography he wrote the little book: "An Autobiographical Study". I do not think there exists another autobiography which reveals so little about the personal life of the author. In the first chapter Freud mentions that he

*(Read at the Freud Centenary of Michigan State Univ., East Lansing, November 29, 1956)

was born in 1856, now a hundred years ago, in Freiberg in Moravia, that he was four years old when his family settled in Vienna, that he was always the first in his class and that he was attracted by the biological theories of Darwin. Goethe's fragmentary essay "Natur" determined his vocational choice of studying medicine. He was particularly interested in the biological aspect of medical studies. The last we hear of his personal life is that he married 1886 after four years of courtship and engagement. The rest of his autobiography Freud devoted to the presentation of the sequence of his great discoveries and the gradual building of his edifice of concepts and constructs which we call psychoanalysis. This in itself demonstrates one of Freud's outstanding features, namely his ability to transfer his undoubtedly strong narcissism to his work, which thus became all-important for him.

But Freud also gave us the justification for our desire to obtain a fuller and more intimate picture of his personality. In his address in the Goethe house in Frankfurt in 1930 Freud said: "There is no doubt that a biography satisfies a strong need within us. We feel this so much if unfortunate historical circumstances deny gratification of this needs as for example in the case of Shakespeare But how do we justify such a need to obtain knowledge of the life circumstances of a man whose works have become so important to us? Generally we are told this is due to the desire to bring such a man nearer to us as a human being. Let us agree to this; it is then the need to establish an emotional relationship to such men, to add them to the series of the paternal figures, teachers and other such models, whom we have known or whose influence we have experienced. We expect that their personalities will be as magnificent and admirable as the works which we received from them."*

If we do not deceive ourselves or are not deceived by the biographers, we make the painful discovery that personal

*"Ansprache im Frankfurter Goethehaus", Die Psychoanalytische Bewegung, Band II, 1930, p. 429

behavior and personal traits often do not coincide with the spirit and the message of the works of a great man. Ludwig van Beethoven is a good example of such a discrepancy which the biographers try to deny at the cost of truth as Mrs. Sterba and I attempted to demonstrate in our book "Beethoven and His Nephew."^{**}

It is most gratifying to recognize that Freud's works and his personality expressed in his actions and his attitudes are not in contradiction to his writings. Freud reveals much of his personality in his publications, in certain respects more than any other mortal has ever revealed about himself. Anybody who reads Freud with an open mind can find him there as a personality of whom one can rightly say what he said about Karl Abraham, that he was "integer vitae scelerisque purus"[†] (leading a life of integrity and free from vice). However, the objective presentation which publication necessitates together with the modesty of the author underscores certain traits which I consider outstanding in his personality. It is these about which I would like to talk to you.

When psychoanalysis became the main interest and the occupation of my life, I had the unique opportunity to come in contact with the founder of the science to which I have devoted all my efforts. During this contact I could not help being impressed by Freud's personality, an impression that has been enforced by the numerous informations which became available since his death. This impression I would like you to share with me through this paper. However, this undertaking meets with some difficulty. We all have a deep-seated need either to find an ideal person or to form an image of such an ideal, when we find somebody who lends himself to such transformation in our imagination. The term "hero worship" and "heroization" is used for such tendencies and has acquired a depreciative connotation in our period of crumbling values. And if I make too

^{**}Pantheon Books, New York 1954

[†]Sigmund Freud, *Gesammelte Schriften* XI, p. 283

ardent an attempt to convey to you how keenly I feel about the uniqueness of the personality of the man to whose work I have devoted my life, I might achieve the opposite of my intention; to allow you to participate in my admiration for certain lesser known traits of this great person. At the same time I am very well aware that I possess neither the literary nor the linguistic qualification to perform such a task. Fortunately I will be able to draw from many original sources which present my topic much better than I could, namely Freud's letters.

I became acquainted with psychoanalysis shortly after the First World War and finished my training at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute in 1926. It was at the occasion of Freud's 70th birthday, May 6, 1926, that I saw him for the first time. A reception was given at his house, Berggasse 19, in Vienna and the members of the Institute were introduced to him. It was the first time he appeared at a large gathering after his operation for cancer of the jaw in 1922. You can imagine with what awe this neophyte looked forward to the occasion of becoming acquainted with the master.

When I saw him I was surprised that he was so much smaller than I had imagined him. His face was familiar from the many photographs I had seen. What I noticed particularly was the vividness of his movements and the alertness and expressiveness of his hands. His handshake was very warm and had something indefinably personal. I saw Freud once more during the same year. In the fall of 1926 Karl Abraham died and Freud attended the meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society held in memory of the deceased. The meeting was to start at 8 o'clock and Freud appeared at 8 o'clock sharp. Theodor Reik, known to you at least from his "Listening with the Third Ear", was the main speaker. He was a few minutes late and when he stormed into the assembly which was already waiting for him for approximately three minutes, Freud said to him with a very critical inflection: "We thought you would not come any more." From then on I never dared to be a minute late for an appointment or a meeting with him. Freud certainly

knew how to enforce punctuality. But this was the only time that I saw him indignant though one could sometimes feel the potentiality of a wrath, which he describes so well in his paper on the Moses of Michelangelo. But his self control had been developed to a very unusual degree.

When I later became a member of the board of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, I had the privilege of attending the scientific meetings of the Board which were held in Freud's apartment, approximately 4 to 6 times yearly from 1928 to 1934. There I had the opportunity to observe Freud in scientific discussions and to admire his uncanny insight, the clarity of his thinking which always enabled him to go right to the core of a problem, his restraint in rejecting ideas which seemed wrong to him, and the inexhaustible wealth of similes and anecdotes by which he demonstrated his point.

These are certainly outstanding traits of Freud, however, they still show his personality in the somewhat controlled situation of a scientific meeting. They do not reveal Freud in his very personal relationship, in his feelings about the ones near his heart or in need of his help.

The recent years have brought forth the publication of a quantity of personal material about Freud, which corrects and rectifies, and also rounds out the picture which had been formed in the mind of the students of his works and his science. The most important and original material of this kind is, no doubt, Freud's letters. For Freud was an 'homme de lettre', in every sense of the term. This is borne out by the literary quality of his writings. He still possessed the art of writing letters which is so much lost in our time, and an amazing willingness and readiness to write them. Whoever wrote to him received an answer, almost always by return mail, written by Freud in longhand. Freud had no secretary and did not use the convenience of a typewriter, which so often mechanizes thinking and feeling. In these letters that he reveals himself as a very unique and exemplary human being. There must be thousands of his letters around the world, and only very few have been made avail-

able by publication. From these few I can only refer to a minimal fraction in this presentation.

There came first the publication of Freud's letters to Fliess which are of such importance for the student of the development of analytic thought in Freud's mind. But they show him also as deeply devoted to a friend. Freud admired, almost worshipped, Fliess as somebody superior to him. It is fascinating to observe in the sequence of the letters how Freud overcame the strong attachment to his friend during his self-analysis till the friendship dissolved into detachment and coolness. It was the last time that Freud developed such a type of friendship. From then on he was superior in all relationships which he developed. Through his self-analysis he found himself as the person destined to lead that he remained from thereon.

The next publication, the first volume of Jones' biography of Sigmund Freud, was most revealing. Again it is mainly the correspondence of Freud, that corrects the idea we had formed of the man and this time the revelation is most surprising. I am referring specifically to Freud's letters to his bride during the four years of acquaintance, courtship and engagement. And what is condensed in his autobiography into the short sentence: "In the autumn of 1886, I married the girl who had been waiting for me in a distant city for more than four years",* unfolds in the letters as a fascinating story of a most intense emotional relationship. Unfortunately Jones publishes only excerpts from 13 letters of the more than 900 which Freud wrote during this period from the awakening of his love feeling for Martha till their marriage. But even these few quotations make us participate in an emotional experience which runs the whole gamut of feelings, from the most tender budding of love with all its bliss and hopefulness to tumultuous outbreaks of jealousy, impatience,

*Sigmund Freud: "An Autobiographical Study", The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis 1936, p. 23

Since 1956 many of Freud's letters have been published. The most important collection is Letters of Sigmund Freud. Selected and edited by Ernest L. Freud, Basic Books, Inc. New York 1960

suspicion and despair. And every one of these letters, even in the English translation, show by their *content* that they were written by an unusual person, and by their *style*, that this person possessed the gift of great writing. If once revealed in its entirety this correspondence will belong to the world-literature of great love letters. The beauty and the impact of their stormy emotional expression is surpassed by few others.

After his self-analysis Freud's literary style gradually reached the maturity which we admire so much in his scientific writing. I hardly know a written personal utterance by Freud which does not indicate, even if only by a slight inflection of the sentence or by the significant choice of the verbal expression, that it came from a person of highest culture and keenest insight, and of a very unusual interest in the person whom he addressed.

I have in my possession a short notice which was an answer to a letter which I had written to Freud from Switzerland in the Spring of 1939, half a year before his death. In my letter I announced to him that I was going to leave Europe and settle in the United States. Two days later I received an answer from England, written in his characteristic longhand. It started with the words: "Meine herzlichsten Wuensche fuer Wanderung und Ankunft." I wish I could convey to you how these words sound in German. The best translation I can find, "my cordial wishes for migration and arrival" express only insufficiently the loftiness of style, which immediately reminds one of the writing of Goethe in his later period.

The literary quality of Freud's style has been commented on repeatedly. It is not the least due to his literary style that Freud received the highest honor Germany had to bestow on a writer, namely the Goethe-prize of the city of Frankfurt, Goethe's birthplace.

Goethe, the greatest German poet of all times, was Freud's model in many respects. Goethe determined Freud's vocational choice as we already mentioned; Goethe's biological studies which lead to important discoveries like the

intermaxillary bone, the development of plant leaves into petals, the recognition that the bones of the skull are transformed vertebrae, must have impressed on the young Freud that an unusual literary gift, which Freud no doubt knew he himself also possessed, can be combined with scientific studies.

But foremost of all, Freud developed his literary style on Goethe's writings. We find many similarities between Freud's and Goethe's style and they have been pointed out by the scholars of literature. When reading the more personal expressions of Freud as well as those of Goethe one feels immediately lifted up to a higher plane of thinking and insight, a broader viewpoint, deep wisdom and an attitude of nobility of spirit, which is far above the common. Of both, Goethe as well as Freud, could be said what Freud wrote about James Putnam: "The noble became his second nature, and making a deal with lower things was an impossibility for him."*

But there is one important difference between the two great men. Goethe in his letters, for example the ones to his friend and literary companion Friedrich Schiller, though often expressing personal interest, is always somewhat aloof and reserved, self-centered and of Olympian distance. With Freud, this was different. Even in the short notice to me which I quoted he combined the lofty style with a warm interest in my future. It is this human interest of the highest kind which one finds in Freud's letters whenever he addressed himself to anyone, be he near and dear to him or distant and even unknown. To most people, who know Freud only as a scientist and from his printed writings this human interest of Freud in others comes as a surprising revelation. And still this human interest seems to me to be one of the most outstanding characteristics of this great man. Freud's letters to friends reveal him as deeply concerned about their welfare, and attuned and sensitive to the finest shades of their emotions. But his is not a passive empathy and understanding; one feels in his answers a most sincere

*Sigmund Freud: *Gesammelte Schriften* XI, p. 176

effort to react to the person who turned to him, with an attitude which I can best designate as "giving".

He gave to his friends in this manner untiringly, he nursed the relationship with limitless efforts as long as he considered the other person worthy of his friendship, and showed a remarkable tolerance in respect to the shortcomings of his friends. Not that he was not able to criticize and seriously reproach them; but he never did this destructively and always with obvious regret that he had to do it. In this connection I would like to quote a letter which he wrote to Theodor Reik. We have to admire Reik for publishing this letter in his book: "The Search Within",** though Freud severely criticizes him in it. Some of Reik's personality traits provided considerable difficulties for him and others. He felt easily slighted, and the fact that he was not an M.D. seems to have caused him considerable trouble. One can easily conclude this from the numerous aggressive and contemptuous remarks about medical colleagues in his books. In 1928 Reik wrote to Freud. His letter was filled with bitterness towards some colleagues who had hurt his pride, and it gave uninhibited expression to his indignation. Reik even expressed the intention to publish his aggressive accusations.

During this time Freud was in a Berlin Sanatorium where he underwent one of the numerous operations which were still necessary after his cancerous growth in the mouth region had been radically removed. Freud's answer to Reik's invectives reads as follows:

"Dear Herr Doctor:

I cannot explain your attitude except in the following way. You send me those remarks, submit yourself to my decision as to whether they should be printed, and anticipate that I shall condemn them as unworthy of you in form and content. In doing that you give expression to your feelings and discharge them without any risk.

The calculation is correct, but it grieves me much

**The Search Within. Farrar, Strauss & Cudahy, New York 1956, p. 647

that you even need such therapy. Your hostility transgresses all justified measure, blasts the frontiers of what is permissible, spoils your presentation, and must sadden anyone, who, as I, has the interest of a friend in you and highly appreciates your achievements. It cannot possibly go on like that.

I would have asked you long ago to see me, but I am at present in a bad state of transition, still unable to do anything and compelled to hide like a crab that changes its shell.

Cordially yours,
Freud"

Unfortunately Freud's letter is only available in English translation so that one is not able to get the real flavor of it, but we recognize that Freud does not hesitate to be very sharp in his criticism of Reik whom he otherwise held in great respect. However his general attitude is far from destructive and annihilating. It emphasizes how it grieves Freud that Reik is so disturbed and needs handling of his problem. The fatherly yet stern admonition, "It cannot possibly go on like that", must have impressed Reik deeply by its finality. Reik remarks to the letter that he found it "well justified in its criticism".

But it was when a friend was in distress that Freud rose to the occasion in a manner which shows him fully as the great human being he was.

Recently a little book appeared about Freud — another Centenary publication.* The author is Ludwig Binswanger, a psychiatrist in Switzerland, now probably in his late seventies. He is still the director of a well known psychiatric Sanitarium in Kreuzlingen on the Bodensee in Switzerland. Binswanger visited Freud in Vienna in 1907 after having become aware of psychoanalysis during his psychiatric residency at Burghölzli near Zurich, at a time when Jung and Bleuler occupied themselves enthusiastically with Freud's findings. Binswanger was deeply impressed by Freud.

*Ludwig Binswanger: Sigmund Freud - Reminiscences of a Friendship. Grune & Stratton, New York and London 1957

and his teachings and joined the psychoanalytic movement. In his "Reminiscences of a Friendship" Binswanger gives an account of his contact with psychoanalysis from his growing interest and participation in the movement, to his gradual cooling off due to an increasing interest in philosophy and a different psychotherapeutic approach. At the same time he describes the course of his personal relationship to Freud, which does not go parallel with his interest in psychoanalysis, for his friendship and admiration for Freud remained unchanged when he drifted away from pure psychoanalysis. Binswanger presents in his book all the letters that Freud wrote to him. I would like to quote from two of these because they made the deepest impression on me.

In 1912 Binswanger had an attack of appendicitis and reported to Freud that he would have to undergo an operation. When he was operated on, it turned out that not only the appendix had to be removed but also a tumor of a very malignant nature, which according to the statistics of the time gave him a life-span of one to three years. He wrote to Freud about this.

It was one of the most painful situations in which Freud was put by this communication. What can one say or do in such a predicament, when a friend tells us that he will have to die within a short period? Compassion and sympathy will sound empty, consolation will be awkward and easily have a false and hypocritical ring in the face of doom. We all, I think, would be very much at a loss if we had to react in a letter to such disastrous news from a friend. I consider it most admirable and unique in its greatness of spirit how Freud reacted to Binswanger's letter. I quote from Binswanger's book: "Freud's answer to my letter about this (April 14, 1912), which I will never forget, and which attached me to him more than ever before, read:

'I, an old man, who will have no right to complain if his life ends in a few years (and I have decided not to complain) am particularly pained when one of my flowering young men - one of those who were supposed to continue my own life - tells me that he has become uncertain of his life. I have

gradually composed myself and recalled that despite the present doubts you still have every chance, and that you have only been reminded more forcefully of the uncertainty which keeps all of us in suspense, and which we so readily forget. Now you won't forget it, and life, as you write, will have for you a special and enhanced charm. Moreover we shall hope for what our present knowledge permits us to think of without any self-deception. Naturally I shall keep the secret, in accordance with your wishes. But it is natural that I should desire to see you as soon as I can do so without inconveniencing you. How about Whitsun? You will write to me whether this is all right with you*)

We can understand that Binswanger found this answer unforgettable and that it tied him close to the great man. It is moving to read how happy Binswanger was when Freud soon afterwards travelled to Kreuzlingen to see him. Fortunately Binswanger stayed alive and the two men remained friends till Freud's death, although Binswanger did not participate in the analytic movement in later years, and developed his interest towards trends of a different nature. Freud never held this against him, and emphasized his loyalty to him in the 25th year of their friendship in another letter.

Freud wrote to Binswanger at another occasion in which we ordinary mortals are so often at a loss of words of significance and help. It was when Binswanger informed Freud that his eldest son had died. Freud wrote to him:

"We know that the acute grief we feel after a loss will come to an end, but that we will remain inconsolable, and will never find a substitute. Everything that comes to take the place of the lost object, even if it fills it completely, nevertheless remains something different. And in fact it is a good thing that it should be so. It is the only way of perpetuating love, which we do not wish to give up"*)

I think this letter speaks for itself. How Binswanger felt towards Freud, although the latter did not agree with many of Binswanger's later theories and viewpoints, is best demon-

*Ludwig Binswanger: "Sigmund Freud: Reminiscences of a Friendship", Grune & Stratton, New York and London 1957, p. 39

*loc. cit., p. 84

strated by a quotation from a letter which Binswanger wrote to Mrs. and Anna Freud on the occasion of Freud's death. He said:

"You know that it was not his scientific achievement and genius alone that bound me to him, nor the crucial influence he had on my whole scientific career. Of more importance is the fact that for decades I was deeply responsive to the greatness and unflinching spiritual and moral force of his personality. But underlying all that was my love for him, which has remained completely unchanged from the day of our first meeting in Vienna in 1907 to this day. It is one of the great happinesses of my life that your husband and father sensed this love and responded to it with his unswerving friendship. In our correspondence there is nothing that gave me greater happiness than his statement of a few years ago that we have been loyal to each other for twenty-five years. But above all I shall never forget that in 1912 he interrupted his strenuous professional activities and came to see me here at Kreuzlingen after I had informed him that I was severely ill. This visit is one of the most impressive proofs of personal devotion that I have experienced in my life." *)

But it was not only towards close friends in distress that Freud felt the obligation and inner need to respond with his unusual attitude of sympathy and giving. Anybody who turned to him in anguish and despair he felt was entitled to such a response.

A few years ago Alfred C. Kinsey published a letter of Freud's in the *American Journal of Psychiatry*. The letter, written in longhand, was addressed to an American mother who had written to Freud, obviously in great distress about her son. When she sent Freud's letter to Kinsey she accompanied it with one of her own in which she said:

"Dear Dr. Kinsey:

Herewith I enclose a letter from a Great and Good man which you may retain. - From a Grateful Mother."

Freud's letter to this mother, written in English, reads as follows:

*)loc. cit., p. 101

"Dear Mrs. ———

I gather from your letter that your son is a homosexual. I am most impressed by the fact that you do not mention this term yourself in your information about him. May I question you, why you avoid it? Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage but it is nothing to be ashamed of, no vice, no degradation, it cannot be classified as an illness; we consider it to be a variation of the sexual function produced by a certain arrest of sexual development. Many highly respectable individuals of ancient and modern times have been homosexuals, several of the greatest men among them (Plato, Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, etc.). It is a great injustice to persecute homosexuality as a crime and cruelty, too. If you do not believe me, read the books of Havelock Ellis.

By asking me if I can help, you mean, I suppose, if I can abolish homosexuality and make normal heterosexuality take its place. The answer is, in a general way, we cannot promise to achieve it. In a certain number of cases we succeed in developing the blighted germs of heterosexual tendencies which are present in every homosexual, in the majority of cases it is no more possible. It is a question of the quality and the age of the individual. The result of treatment cannot be predicted.

What analysis can do for your son runs in a different line. If he is unhappy, neurotic, torn by conflicts, inhibited in his social life, analysis may bring him harmony, peace of mind, full efficiency, whether he remains a homosexual or gets changed. If you make up your mind he should have analysis with me - I don't expect you will -, he has to come over to Vienna. I have no intention of leaving here. However, don't neglect to give me your answer.

Sincerely yours with kind wishes,

Freud.

P.S. I did not find it difficult to read your handwriting. Hope you will not find my writing and my English a harder task.'')

To appreciate Freud's letter to an unknown person one just has to imagine how almost any other psychiatrist would have answered such a letter. The answer would have been dictated to a secretary and sent as a typed letter. It would read: "In response to your letter I would like to inform you that in order to evaluate the case of your son I would

*The American Journal of Psychiatry, Volume 107, No. 10, 1951, p. 786

have to have a personal interview with him. Would you please make contact with my secretary for an appointment.

Sincerely yours, "

Or he would refer the case to another psychiatrist. Not so the 79-year old, ailing Freud. How far he goes to comfort this distressed mother with an evaluation of homosexuality, a correction of the popular and legal attitude toward it, and with a short but very lucid explanation of the origin of this abnormality! How much care he takes to explain that therapy is possible but has its limitations! He asks her to answer him in any case, and makes a special effort in a postscript to assure her that he did not consider it an imposition that she wrote to him. We can understand that in her letter to Alfred C. Kinsey she calls Freud a "Great and Good man" and signs it as "a grateful mother."

Nothing characterizes better the nature of Freud's response when someone was in need than what he said when it was drawn to his attention that somebody for whom he was not able to do anything needed help; he said: "Hier kann ich wirklich nur mit Geld helfen." ("In this case I can really only help with money.") Material help, though it had to be offered - and Freud spent considerable sums of money for others when they were in need - was the poorest kind of assistance which he felt did not free him from the deeply felt obligation to help with other means in form of emotional response and expression of compassion on a higher level and spiritual assistance.

I have the feeling I should apologize for having given you such a limited presentation of Freud's personality. In fact I have spoken mainly of one of the many outstanding character-traits that we find in him in so rare a combination as occurs hardly more than once in a millenium. But this one trait, which the letters of Freud I quoted, demonstrate so well, is less recognized by many of the readers of his writings. I consider this trait one of the most admirable features in Freud's personality. This inner obligation to give where he

felt called upon made him, to use the words of an American mother: "a great and good man."

861 Whittier Blvd.

Grosse Pointe 30, Michigan.

A Ritualistic Aspect of Smoking

by

Irving Berent, M.D.

Although it is generally accepted that smoking is for the most part related to oral gratifications, this explanation does not fully cover those situations we commonly hear, such as:

"I don't really enjoy smoking, I just like to have something in my hand."

or,

"Since I've stopped smoking, I don't know what to do with my hands."

or,

"It's true, I go through two or three packs of cigarettes a day but I don't really smoke much — I just light up frequently and take a few puffs."

True, these statements may conceivably represent denial to mask the guilt of indulging in such oral gratifications. However, recently a bright young serviceman indirectly shed additional light on this subject when spontaneously describing a ritual he has utilized since his cessation of smoking nine months ago for "economic reasons."

Before describing the ritual and his immediate associations, a brief thumbnail sketch of the young man might be in order. He is a twenty-one year old (younger appearing), immaculately-dressed, somewhat shy, naive individual of high school training who sensitively related the following complaint: "I'm markedly nervous (diffuse — 'I don't know why') and at times my hands begin to shake so severely that I am not able to hold tools in my hand and consequently cannot perform my work adequately (as electronics technician). In fact, at times I am not able to even hold a pen and write." The patient dated the onset of his difficulty to the third grade (age 8) when he had a series of childhood ill-

nesses that necessitated his missing much of school. However, he was promoted at that time only to be held back in the subsequent grade when his "deficiencies" were made manifest. (This has had even more meaning for the patient who was the third of three siblings 7 and 8 years his senior and who has stated, "No matter what I could do, they (the siblings) could do it ten times better"). Currently the patient hopes to complete his tour of duty as an enlisted man, return to his civilian life to complete college, and then return to the military as an officer ("knowledge is strength"). In regard to strength, it is to be noted that the patient's father was sickly during the patient's formative years having "lung trouble" (perhaps related to the patient's giving up smoking).

Having this history in mind, one is impressed by the manner in which the "ritual" was described. The patient had been discussing the "paradoxes of military life" including an example which he felt was "classic" in its irony: "To have a *non-smoker* assigned the duty of policing the tgrounds for cigarette butts." At this point, I asked the patient whether he had ever been a smoker. His reply was that he had smoked about two years but had given it up nine months ago as it was "too expensive" because "fellows were always bumming cigarettes from me so that maybe I would have only two or three from a whole pack." He acknowledged that his tension would be somewhat alleviated but, "It wasn't the actual smoking. I think that it was just that I had something to reach — maybe it was just reaching the match and striking it; but maybe it was just *touching* the cigarette. Yes, I think maybe it *was* just touching the cigarette because when I am nervous now, I've substituted reaching for a cigarette with reaching for my *favorite screwdriver* which I keep in my left shirt pocket." He further humorously continued in order to cover the embarrassment of his disclosure), "It's a real good screwdriver, too. It's civilian (and thereby *personal*) and much better than the tools in my tool box (government issued). Anyways, it's much less likely to wear out than cigarettes and costs less,, too!"

Immediately following these comments, the patient

drifted into the discussion of his work in which he has frequently received minor electrical shocks. "You know, I've already had the tip of my favorite screwdriver burned — guess I may have to buy a new one for 75c. In my work I have another man assigned to me, whose job is just to keep my company (in our line of work the government feels this is best). *If I should place my hands where they don't belong*, at least there will be another man there to turn off the current."

In contemplating the significance of the patient's remarks, it seems that one is struck by his castration anxiety and his obsessive means of partial alleviation: "Yes, my penis is still here!" In addition, the patient is able to touch and use "the untouchable" with the tacit consent of his co-worker. Indeed, the latter will even protect him should he get in trouble (perhaps related to the custom of visiting houses of ill repute in groups, there being "strength in numbers")! Thus,, not only is the assurance of the organ repetitively established by his touching his screwdriver (cigarette) but he is even allowed to use it! And further, "father" is there to see that everything is safe! Thus, substitutive masturbation as well as coitus might be permissible. Analogously, the preparations for the smoking act being socially accepted may provide comparable relief of anxiety; or at least, it did so for my patient. And so, the "paradox" by which the patient first introduced his ritual, namely "a non-smoker picking up cigarette butts," is more than just the superficial irony and sadism of compelling an individual to work and clean up the "after pleasures" (cigarette butts) of others. Instead, it represents the fulfillment of the alchemist's goal: to make gold out of feces (turn the worst work into pleasure) since the individual who picks up cigarette butts usually does so with a long pointed stick — a tool much longer than any cigarette! In addition, the paradox has the joyful phantasy outcome of enabling the individual to enjoy sexual gratifications even though observed. Indeed, not only observed, but protected! The sad aspect of the paradox is the reality — to have but a screwdriver (cigarette)

in one's hand! An additional speculative corollary of the above would concern those women smokers whose basic pleasure in smoking might be in the "fore pleasure": signifying the denial of their penis lack and/or comforting reassurance of its substitute presence.

In summary, a ritualistic or compulsive act that has been utilized as a substitute for the preparatory acts of smoking is described. It is this writer's opinion that his specific patient's account epitomizes a phenomenon that occurs more generally — which for a better name might be called the "fore pleasures of smoking."

ADDENDUM: Since the writing of the above, another feature of smoking has been brought to my attention that further exemplifies the psycho-sexual multideterminants of this particular act. An ophthalmologist colleague emphasized the enjoyment of watching one's smoke rings, smoke columns, and the like. An exaggerated instance of his experience was that of his patient who gave up smoking upon becoming blind — his rationale being: "If I cannot see my smoke, there's no pleasure in it for me." The gratification of this visual feature of smoking, upon further inquiry, has had some measure of confirmation. A second colleague mentioned that his father had been a director of an institution for the blind and had expressed to him years ago that it was his general impression that the blind in his care smoked much less frequently. A third colleague volunteered the opinion that, now as his attention was focused upon the subject, in the evenings when his smoke would be less visible, he had less desire to smoke and could not understand *why*, as he thought that *logically* he should enjoy smoking *more* at such times of the day.

Perhaps this visual aspect of smoking is a more subtle, creative derivative of the anal period which has expressed itself in other less "sublime" manipulations such as stuffing a pipe with tobacco and the occasional messes to which this act frequently lends itself. However, it is also conceivable that watching one's smoke might be an extension of the castration anxiety *alleviation mechanism* mentioned in the main

body of this paper. Not only is the sexual organ present (through the touch of the cigarette), but look how big it is — as one watches the smoke lift gently into the heavens!

9730 Wilshire Blvd.
Beverly Hills, California

Hang It All

by

Nandor Fodor

The phrase has no gruesome significance. Yet a primitive, murderous repression is hidden behind it. A charitable interpretation: keep matters in suspense, is contradicted by the annoyance or rage with which the phrase is uttered. It is doubtful whether the word "hang" will ever be free of horrible associations. Even the watered down substitute: suspend, has a disquieting ring: As an eloquent example I recall the description of a demonstrator of public clairvoyance to a woman in the audience, saying "Suspended above you . . ." The woman interrupted: "That's him, he had hanged himself."

The recent capture of highly placed Nazi criminals who had been in hiding ever since Hitler's defeat, may justify some reflections on the psychological make-up of the executioners.

No profession (or occupation) throughout the ages has inspired more awe and fear than that of the executioner. In the sentimental novelistic age he was always described as a man accursed, who lived in a forlorn, wild section of inhabited places and was shunned by all the living. He was believed to be a monster, a kind of Frankenstein who had nothing in common with the rest of humanity. The thought that the hangman could be human and might be just performing a job, however queer and horrible, was unthinkable - and it still is. Like a fatal disease, the profession was usually handed down in the family. The son inherited it from the father and his assistants just had to be misfits, gnome-like, repulsive creatures whom society had rejected.

The last war had destroyed this novelistic concept. Whole groups of executioners grew up in Germany and elsewhere. They volunteered or were trained for the job. No

genocide could have been practised by single professionals. The S.S. in Germany or the M.V.D. in Russia made the old-fashioned hangman obsolete. He was a gentleman compared to them. He had a right to feel superior, so he had to die out.

The chief attraction to the profession seems obvious: a hangman can kill with impunity and without guilt. For someone who hates his fellow men and wants to revenge himself on their society, or for someone who loves torture and the sight of victims writhing in agonizing fear, to be an executioner may be an ideal of living.

To Dumas we owe the perfect hangman's alibi in *The Three Mousqueteers*. The "bourreau of Lille" acts as a rightenous man in the severing the head of Milady Winters. He is the official executioner of the district, and he receives a formal, written summons for the execution from Athos, his liege lord; but he also has a private reason to exult in the task, and he loses not the opportunity of revealing it in order to let his victim shrink into utterly hopeless despair: Milady was responsible for the ruin and suicide of his own beloved brother, a minister of the Church. Ever since his death, the bourreau de Lille lived in lust for her blood and now his great moment has arrived. He could kill with savage joy and feel just before God and men.

The executioners employed by the Inquisition and during witch trials cut a less spectacular figure. During the last war conscience fell into disrepute and sadism became more rampant or acceptable. The sing-song murder of 600,000 Jews in Hungary was preceded by this inflammatory ditty:

Erger-berger-Schossberger
Every Jew a scound-er-el.

Schossberger was a wealthy Jewish landowner in Hungary. Who cared if a scoundrel was bumped off! It was the duty of every "decent" Nazi to murder Jews wherever he could. He was living up to the standard set up by the communists to whom the capitalists or members of the bourgeoisie were similar scum of the earth.

During the first communistic regime in Hungary in

1918, Tior Szamuelli was the most dreaded man of the country. He loved to hang people on the roadside, whether they were peasants who refused to give up their food or Jews who had hidden their jewelery. I knew him personally as, at the beginning of the war, we were employed together in the War Office by the Censure Committee. Both of us represented news services and we worked and slept in the same room from 5 P.M. until 12 noon the following day. However, his sophistication and his impudence was so unbearable that he was discharged after a month. As a result, he was drafted and, on the front, captured y the Russians.

I did not see him again until he was at the height of his terroristic reputation. He had just returned from Moscow, after a first aeroplane trip to that Mecca of the Reds, and I was amazed at the bronzed strength and heroic imitation he showed. When I last saw him he was a pale-faced cynic, bored with life, crusading against the Catholic Church but otherwise showing no potential for the horror he had learned to embody in Russia.

Bodnar, the official hangman of Hungary in 1944, after the Nazis were driven out by the Russians, was a pale shadow compared to him. A young journalist who attended a mass execution, tried to form in his mind a picture of the character and social status of the hangman in a communistic state. Coming from the direction of the death cells, a priest passed him by. His face was set and he appeared to be lost in thought as well might be a man who had just taken the last confession of those who were to be hanged next.

The eager voices buzzing around the executioner roused the priest from his gloom. He stopped, took a long look at the group and said acidly:

"Gentlemen, I am so glad you are trying to make him your friend."

The journalist felt the world taking a spin around him, and for a moment he lost his sense of reality. Bodnar was known to be a man who loved playing football, who liked playing cards and was known to crack jokes like any regular guy. Suddenly, he ceased to be amiable, became grim and

foreboding, growing taller and conveying the chilling thought (borne out by subsequent events) that you cannot tell whose turn is next and it will be he who would squeeze the last breath out of you.

Some time after the adventure of this journalist, I met a former Hungarian cabinet minister in exile who would have been next if he had not found asylum in this country. He was the first one I know who made practical use of this uncertainty of fate.

"I used to keep a notebook in Hungary", he said, "and whenever somebody was very nasty to me, I just put his name down and waited. Here, see it for yourself, most of them have been hanged since."

He showed me a little black book, with many names crossed out. I shuddered.

I have never seen a more gruesome illustration of wishful thinking.

1148 Fifth Avenue
Pent House B.C.
New York 28, N.Y.